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Abstract
Over the past two decades, the number of Americans on the extremes of the political
spectrum has more than doubled, and politically motivated aggression has increased. In
addition, an unprecedented division has emerged between the left and right on
fundamental political values and animosity continues to rise. The purpose of this study
was to explore factors that potentially contribute to political polarization and animosity in
the United States, including authoritarianism, strength of partisan commitment, and
distorted thinking. The participants for this study comprised 513 individuals from the
general population of the United States recruited from online platforms. Participants
completed an online questionnaire that included the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions
(ICD), the Left-Wing Authoritarian Scale (LWA Scale) or the Right-Wing Authoritarian
Scale (RWA Scale), and the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ), as well as
demographic questions. Results indicated that distorted thinking (scores on the ICD)
predicted aggression levels; however, partisan strength and authoritarianism did not.
Moreover, ANOVA analyses revealed no significant differences in endorsement of the
frequency of cognitive distortions among individuals who identified as Moderate, Very
Left Wing, and Very Right Wing or between individuals who identified as Independent,
Democrat, and Republican. This study furthers the field’s understanding of the role that
distorted thinking plays in our charged political atmosphere and provides insight into how
the field might work to reduce political tension through targeting distorted thinking in the
general population.
Key words: cognitive distortions, ICD, partisanship, extremism, authoritarianism,
aggression
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Statement of the Problem
Over the past two decades, the number of Americans on the extremes of the
political spectrum has more than doubled, while the percentage of individuals in the
center of the distribution (moderates) has decreased (Pew Research Center, 2014). This
shift entails most Democrats moving to the left (more liberal) and most Republicans
moving to the right (more conservative), with less overlap between the parties. In
addition, the political values of Democrats and Republicans are now further apart
ideologically than at any point in more than two decades, with these divisions deepest
among those who identify as most engaged in the political process (Pew Research Center,
2014). According to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), authoritarianism has become one
of the main political forces contributing to this divide. The study of authoritarianism
began as a means of theorizing about what makes a person prejudiced, dogmatic, and
intolerant of others (Adorno et al., 1950). Authoritarianism was first identified in rightwing conservatives, who were characterized by obedience to authority, moral absolutism,
prejudice, intolerance, and punitiveness towards dissimilar groups (Adorno et al., 1950).
Although the construct of authoritarianism was believed to be more likely to attract
political conservatives than political liberals, recent research has shown that it also exists
to the left of center on the political spectrum (Conway et al., 2018). Left-wing
authoritarianism features the same reliance on simple authority and psychological rigidity
as their conservative counterparts (Conway et al., 2018). This construct, however,
remains controversial in the fields of social and political psychology.
In addition to a more prominent partisan divide with unprecedented differences on
fundamental political values, there has also been a significant increase in negative views
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of opposing parties on each extreme of the political spectrum (Pew Research Center,
2017). Negative views of the opposing party have continued to increase; 81% of both
Democrats and Republicans view the opposite party in unfavorable terms (Pew Research
Center, 2017). A 2019 study by the Pew Research Center found that the share of
Republicans who give Democrats a “cold” rating had risen 14% since 2016, and some
57% of Democrats return the antipathy. A majority of Democrats (55%) also endorsed
that the Republican Party made them “afraid,” with 49% of Republicans expressing the
same fear of the Democratic Party (Pew Research Center, 2017). Moreover, 47% of
Democrats and 46% of Republicans harbored anger towards the opposing party, and 58%
of Democrats and 57% of Republicans expressed a mutual frustration (Pew Research
Center, 2016). As for the perception that the opposition posed a threat, the 2016 study
found that 45% of Republicans viewed Democratic policies as a threat, an increase from
37% in 2014. Democrats included in the study mirrored this result; 41% perceived the
Republican Party’s policies as a threat, an increase of 10% from 2014. In a more recent
national survey, most Democrats (75%) characterized Republicans as more closedminded than other Americans, which held true for Republicans’ view of Democrats
(64%; Pew Research Center, 2020). Both Republicans and GOP-leaning Independents
(94%) and Democrats and sympathetic Independents (92%) perceived strong conflicts
between the two parties (Pew Research Center, 2020).
Furthermore, research has also revealed an increasing inclination toward violence
and aggression against opposing parties. In a 2019 study by Kalmoe and Mason, 15% of
Republicans and 20% of Democrats agreed that the country would be better off if large
numbers of opposing partisans “just died.” Moreover, 9% of both Democrats and
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Republicans agreed that violence would be acceptable if their opponents won the 2020
presidential election (Kalmoe & Mason, 2019). Though these percentages are small, they
represent huge numbers of citizens. Violence did ultimately erupt after the 2020
presential election, in the form of the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol. In addition
to the acceptance of violence in political disputes, violent acts against out-groups are
increasingly prevalent in our society. Studies of Federal Bureau of Investigation data
showed that hate crimes rose significantly during the past few years. According to data
collected by the FBI, 2019 was the deadliest year for Domestic Violent Extremism since
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (2020). According to a 2020 Homeland Security
Assessment, Domestic Violent Extremists presented the most persistent and lethal threat
to the US. Both far-left and far-right attacks hit new peaks in 2020, with the number of
far-right incidents surpassing far-left incidents. According to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, more terrorist plots and attacks were reported in 2020 than in any
year since they began collecting data (2021). These trends can be explained by the
Ideological Conflict Hypothesis (ICH), which emphasizes how individual across the
political spectrum become prejudice against ideologically dissimilar groups (Brandt et al.,
2014).
Another factor potentially contributing to the current political atmosphere in the
US is the intensity of partisanship. Partisanship is defined as a deep psychological
attachment to a particular party, which may include a latent bias that ensures an
individual’s support of that party and policies associated with it (Cohen, 2003).
Partisanship is evaluated along two dimensions: the strength and the direction of the
attachment (Settle et al., 2009). Strong partisanship is often accompanied by disdain for
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the political opposition or out-group (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). According to Huddy
and Bankert (2017), persons with strong partisan identification often act as a means of
defending or enhancing their party’s political position, because their partisan
identification becomes internalized to the point that the party’s failures feel like personal
failures. Strong partisanship has also been associated with increased cognitive rigidity
(Zmigrod et al., 2020).
Zmigrod et al. (2020) determined that individuals who identify more intensely
with a political group or ideology score higher in the underlying psychological trait of
mental rigidity across three independent assessments of cognitive flexibility. Mental
rigidity, also known as cognitive rigidity, has been defined as a lack of flexibility and
openness to considering ideas from different perspectives (Zmigrod et al., 2019).
Cognitive rigidity also involves a tendency to develop and perseverate in a particular
cognitive pattern even in situations in which the pattern is no longer effective (Morris &
Mansell, 2018). Cognitive rigidity and ideology are explained by two conflicting
hypotheses. The rigidity-of-the right hypothesis asserts that cognitive rigidity is
characteristic of right-wing individuals, which has been the dominant perspective for
several decades (Adorno et al., 1950). It is only recently that the ideological extremity
hypothesis, which suggests that individuals on both political extremes (left/liberals and
right/conservatives) are less flexible in their thinking compared to moderates, emerged in
the research (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Individuals who have the strongest beliefs and
affiliations on both the left and right of the political divide have displayed high levels of
mental rigidity (Zmigrod et al., 2020). Using multiple neuropsychological tests, Zmigrod
et al. (2020) found that individuals who endorsed extreme attachment to either the
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Democratic Party or the Republican Party exhibited more mental rigidity and less
cognitive flexibility. Regardless of the ideology, deficits in mental processes governing
the ability to switch between different concepts and tasks have been linked to the
intensity with which individuals attach themselves to political doctrines (Zmigrod et al.,
2020). Mental rigidity has also been linked to extreme attitudes in religiosity,
nationalism, and willingness to resort to violence (Zmigrod & Robbins, 2018).
Individuals with low cognitive flexibility tend to see the world in black-and-white terms,
a type of cognitive distortion (Zmigrod et al., 2019).
Cognitive distortions were first defined as identifiable errors in thinking that
predictably occur when processing information (Beck, 1967). In Aaron Beck’s model,
cognitive distortions result from a reversion to a “primitive information processing
system” that is activated through an interaction with “personal and environmental
factors” (Beck & Weishaar, 1990, p. 24). According to cognitive theory, one’s biased
subjective evaluation of early life experiences shape and maintain fundamental beliefs
known as schemas (Beck, 1970). Schemas play an important role in how individuals
process and assign meaning to stimuli in the environment, and what information in the
environment individuals attend to and remember. They also play a role in
functional/dysfunctional cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns (Beck, 1964).
According to cognitive theory, cognitive distortions serve to support one’s core beliefs
and assumptions (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2005). These habitual ways of thinking are
reinforced by generalizing, omitting, and distorting stimuli (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2005).
Evolutionary theory suggests that cognitive distortions developed as adaptive reactions to
perceptions of threats to one's safety or belief system (Burns, 2008; Gilbert, 1998).
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According to Beck (1999), perceived threats to the self may perpetuate anger
responses as a means of protecting one’s concept of self. Cognitive distortions have been
shown to predict internalizing and externalizing behavior (Barriga et al., 2008; Bruno,
2010). Internalizing behavior involves inner distress, such as depressive or anxiety
symptoms for an individual; in contrast, externalizing behavior involves outward
conflicts with others, such as aggressive, disruptive, or antisocial behaviors (Achenbach
& McConaughy, 1997). Externalizing behaviors are more visible, and their consequences
are more overt (Dekovic et al., 2004). Self-serving cognitive distortions, including
catastrophizing, minimizing, and mislabeling have been shown to be the most significant
predictors of externalizing problems (Bruno, 2010). Within the externalizing domain,
self‐serving distortions have been linked to delinquent and aggressive behavior (Barriga
et al., 2008). Latella-Zakhireh (2009) found that the cognitive distortions of
magnification, externalization of self-worth, and perfectionism were positively associated
with the degree of anger endorsed on the Mahan and DiTomasso Anger Scale by a nonclinical population. Moreover, a specific relationship was found between cognitive
distortions and manifestations of anger, including tendencies toward argumentativeness
(the propensity to argue, with consequent job and relationship problems) and emotional
dyscontrol (the tendency to lose control as a result of angry feelings or thoughts; LatellaZakhireh, 2009). Cognitive distortions are a form of rigid thinking or mental rigidity,
which have also been linked to a willingness to engage in violence and aggression
(Zmigrod & Robbins, 2018).
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Purpose of the Study
The rise of ideological polarization, the divergence of political views to
ideological extremes, intolerance of competing views, partisan animosity, and violence
has made it imperative to investigate factors contributing to our increasingly tense
political climate. Although numerous studies have shown that individuals of different
political affiliations think differently, a literature review revealed no research
investigating the role of cognitive distortions in the context of political party affiliation,
ideological partisan strength, and aggression. The purpose of this study was to determine
whether a manifest difference exists in the frequency of cognitive distortions by
individuals of different political party affiliations and degree of partisan identification,
with cognitive distortions operationalized as the total score on the Inventory of Cognitive
Distortions (ICD). The study specifically examined how the frequency of cognitive
distortions differed between participants who identified as more extreme in their
ideological partisanship (Very Left Wing and Very Right Wing) compared to those who
identified as Moderate in their political partisanship. The study additionally compared
different political partisanships regarding their frequency of engagement in cognitive
distortions. The construct of authoritarianism was also investigated in the context of
political affiliations/ideologies to gain insight into the rise in political animosity in our
society. This study explored whether extreme partisan strength, authoritarianism, and
frequency of cognitive distortions could predict aggression. Investigating cognitive
distortions in the context of political affiliations and ideology may expand the field’s
understanding of the role that distorted thinking plays in our current political atmosphere.
The results of this study will provide the field with further insight into how it might work
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to reduce political tension and violence in America’s current polarized political
environment.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: Self-reported authoritarianism (as measured by either the LWA
Scale or RWA Scale total score), self-identified partisan strength, and endorsement of
frequency of cognitive distortions (as measured by the ICD total score) will predict in a
significant and positive way level of aggression (as measured by the BPAQ total score)
for both right- and left-wing individuals.
Hypothesis II: Individuals who self-identify as Very Left Wing and Very Right
Wing will endorse significantly higher frequency of cognitive distortions (as measured by
the ICD total score) compared to individuals that self-identify as “Moderates.”
Hypothesis III: A significant difference in endorsed frequency of cognitive
distortions (as measured by the ICD total score) will be found between individuals of
different political party affiliations (e.g., Republican, Democrat, Independent, Democratic
Socialist, Socialist, Communist, Fascist/National Socialists, or Other Party/Affiliation).
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Political Ideology in the United States
Ideology has been conceptualized as “the most elusive concept in the whole of
social science” (McLellan, 1986, p. 1). The field of social psychology has long struggled
to come to a consensus regarding the most accurate definition of ideology (Jost et al.,
2009). Erikson and Tedin (2003) defined ideology as “a set of beliefs about the proper
order of society and how it can be achieved” (p. 64). It has also been defined as a “shared
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess” that “provides an
interpretation of the environment and how that environment should be structured”
(Denzau & North, 2000, p.24). Ideology is understood to communicate shared beliefs,
values, and opinions of an identifiable group, class, or society (Knight, 2006). Ideologies
interpret the world by making assumptions about the current state of affairs and future
possibilities (Jost et al., 2009). In the United States, citizens classify themselves along a
political spectrum consisting of liberal, moderate, and conservative ideologies also
known as “the left,” “the political middle,” and “the right,” respectively (Motyl et al.,
2014). Left-wing ideologies are distinguished by their socially progressive viewpoints
with values of equality, social justice, and the necessity of government acting to meet the
people’s needs at its core (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Right-wing ideologies are
characterized as conservative, promoting traditional values over change (Feldman &
Johnston, 2014). Many liberals argue that their political prescriptions enhance individual
liberty and promote American values (Heywood, 2012). Conversely, many conservatives
argue that their philosophy of small government extends human, social, and civil rights
(Heywood, 2012). According to a 2019 study, 55% of Americans held positive views of
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liberalism, while 60% held positive views of conservatism (Pew Research Center).
Moderates are generally characterized as steering a centrist course, advocating various
aspects of both liberalism and conservatism and capable of leaning right or left on the
political spectrum.
Political Affiliations in the United States
In addition to political ideologies, the United States is considered a two-party
political system, comprising the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. Although
these are the two dominant parties, several “third parties” have risen to popularity in the
United States. Though there are a multitude of opinions about what each party represents,
for the purposes of the current study each party’s platform is presented verbatim, directly
from their official website, without comment on its veracity. In addition, because of
obvious limitations, the current study will attempt to be impartial in selection of the most
representative passages and direct the reader to the specific party websites for a complete
statement of party platforms.
Democratic Party.
According to the Democratic National Committee (2016), the Democratic Party is
a left-leaning (liberal) party distinguished by its progressive social positions and belief
that “cooperation is better than conflict, unity is better than division, empowerment is
better than resentment, and bridges are better than walls” (p.1). According to its platform,
the Democratic Party emphasizes raising incomes and “restoring economic security for
the middle class…expanding access to affordable housing and protecting/expanding
Social Security…promoting competition by stopping corporate concentration…ending
systematic inequalities,” and “combating climate change” (pp. 3-11).
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According to a June 2020 national survey, 31% of Americans self-identified as
Democrats (Gallup, 2020). In a study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2019),
Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents were more likely than Republicans and
GOP-leaning Independents to express concern over climate change, economic inequality,
and racism. Most Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents included in the study
(47%) identified as liberals, with 15% describing their views as “very liberal” (Pew
Research Center, 2019), compared to moderates (38%) and conservatives (14%).
Republican Party.
According to the Republican Party, the GOP is a right-leaning (conservative)
party that considers the establishment of a pro-growth tax code “a moral
imperative…private investment as a key driver of economic growth and job creation,”
and emphasizes the importance of international trade and “free financial markets” (GOP,
2016, pp. 1-3). The Republican Party’s platform asserts that “competitiveness equals
jobs,” and that this “equation governs our policies regarding U.S. corporations in the
global economy, with private investment as a key driver of economic growth and job
creation” (p. 2). According to their political platform, the party “supports the
development of all forms of energy that are marketable in the free economy without
subsidies including coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and hydropower” because they
are the “pathway to an independent energy source” (p. 20).
A 2019 Pew Research Center study found that Republicans were more likely to
view crime, illegal immigration, and drug addiction as critical problems that need to be
addressed. A June 2020 national survey found that 25% of Americans self-identified as
Republican (Gallup, 2020). There are additionally several minor parties that present their
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own platforms and candidates for the presidency, although the Democratic and
Republican parties have dominated American politics since 1852.
Self-Described Independents.
Political Independents are voters who do not identify as members of any political
party. A June 2020 national survey found that 40% of Americans self-identified as
Independents (Gallup, 2020). An overwhelming majority of Independents (81%) “lean”
toward either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, despite not identifying with
either party (Pew Research Center, 2018). According to a recent Gallup study, 38% of the
individuals in their national survey identified as Republicans or Republican-leaning
Independents, while 50% identified as Democrats or Democratic-leaning Independents
(2020). More Independents describe their political views as moderate (43%) than
conservative (29%) or liberal (24%) (Pew Research Center, 2018). Independents who do
not lean toward a party have demonstrated a likelihood to hold unfavorable opinions
(37%) of both the Democratic and Republican Parties (Pew Research Center, 2018).
Socialist Party USA.
According to the Socialist Party USA, their party stands for “a fundamental
transformation of the economy, focusing on production for need, not profit” (2020, p.1).
The party additionally advocates for “the right of all workers to organize, for worker
control of industry through the democratic organization of the workplace, for the social
ownership of the means of production and distribution, and for international solidarity
among working people based on common opposition to global capitalism and
imperialism” (p. 2). The Socialist Party USA strives to “establish a radical democracy
that places people's lives under their own control” within a “classless, feminist, socialist
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society free of racism, sexism, homophobia or transphobia, in which people cooperate at
work, at home, and in the community” and conceptualizes socialism as “a new social and
economic order in which workers and consumers control production and community
residents control their neighborhoods, homes, and schools” (p. 11) .
A recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2019) found that 73% of
Americans agreed that corporations have “too much power.” Research has shown that
Americans’ definition of socialism has changed over time. Although many Americans
still view socialism as entailing government control of the economy, modified
communism, and restrictions on freedoms, an increasing number of Americans now view
it as a movement advocating equality (23%, up from 12% in 1949) and government
provision of benefits for all (10%, up from 2% in 1949) (Newport, 2018). According to
the Pew Research Center, 42% of Americans included in their study expressed positive
impressions of socialism (Pew Research Center, 2019). More than eight-in-ten
Republicans (84%) held a negative view of socialism, with a 63% majority expressing a
very negative view, but nearly two-thirds of Democrats (65%) endorsed a positive view
of socialism, with 14% holding a very positive view (Pew Research Center, 2019).
Democratic Socialists of America.
Socialism re-entered the nation’s political discourse over the past several years
due to the rise in popularity of avowed Democratic Socialists, such as Bernie Sanders and
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Newport, 2018). Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)
advocate certain socialist ideals through “the democratic process” and define Democratic
Socialism as a political movement that believes that the “economy and society should be
run democratically to meet public needs for all, not to make profits for a few” (2018,
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para. 1). The DSA consider themselves socialists because they reject “an international
economic order sustained by private profit, alienated labor, race and gender
discrimination, environmental destruction, and brutality and violence in defense of the
status quo” and profess to advocate reforms that will “weaken the power of corporations
and increase the power of the working people '' (DSA, 2020, para. 4). Democratic
Socialists of America currently have approximately 66,000 members, up from 24,000 in
2017 (DSA, ND). According to a 2019 Gallup survey, since 2010, capitalism (51%) and
socialism (49%) have settled into roughly equal popularity among young adults. Despite
their growing popularity, both Socialists and Democratic Socialists remain
underrepresented in research in the U.S.
Communist Party USA.
Communism is another left-wing political philosophy that purports to share many
of the underlying principles of socialism and opposes capitalism, which it denounces as
“a system by which the U.S. corporations use their economic, political, and military
power of the government to exploit workers, pillage the environment, and corrupt
governments around the world” (CPUSA, 2014, para 3-5). The CPUSA argues that “the
only strategy capable of defeating the extreme right’s implicit and explicit drive toward
fascism is the widest possible organized unity of all class and social forces” (p. 41).
CPUSA advocates a society “where working people, those who produce all the riches of
society, will have political power and will collectively decide priorities for investment
and distribution of our nation’s wealth, for education, health care, housing, nutrition,
recreation, arts, culture, and science in a clean, non-polluting economy” (CPUSA, 2014,
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para. 6; Floyd, 2020, para. 2). As of 2017, membership in the CPUSA was approximately
5,000 (Gomez, 2017).
Each political affiliation listed above share similarities and differences. According
to Brandt et al. (2014), those differences prompt people across the political spectrum to
vehemently oppose ideologically dissimilar viewpoints; therefore, one would expect such
antipathy to exist between members of more dissimilar political affiliations, although this
may not always the case.
National Socialist/Fascist Movements
According to the Antidefamation League (2020), the National Socialist
Movement is the largest “far-right neo-Nazi group” of several avowed Nazi organizations
in the United States, with an estimated 400 members in 32 states. The party idolizes
Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. The group identifies 25 points in their party manifesto as
means of “fighting for civil rights and self-determination of Whites in America”
including a core belief in “promotion of White separation” (The National Socialist
Movement, 2020, p. 1). The party demands a National Socialist government through
which the nation becomes “one bound together by shared race, culture, and identity” and
that “all non-White immigration must be prevented and all non-Whites currently residing
in America be required to leave the nation forthwith and return to their land of origin,
peacefully or by force” (p. 2). The National Socialist Movement has declared its goal to
“be the sole political party of the nation” (p.3).
Antifa.
According to the Antidefamation League, the antifascist protest movement known
as Antifa gained new prominence in the U.S. after the white supremacist “Unite the
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Right” rally in Charlottesville, VA in 2017 (ND). According to the New York Times,
Antifa is “an organization without a leader, a defined structure, or membership roles” but
rather a “movement of activists whose followers share a philosophy of tactics” (BogelBurrough & Garcia, 2020, para. 2-3). The movement campaigns against actions viewed
“as authoritarian, homophobic, racist, or xenophobic” (Bogel-Burrough & Garcia, 2020,
para 5). Antifa is made up of “a loose collection of groups, networks, and individuals
who believe in active, aggressive opposition to far right-wing movements” by means of
direct confrontation (Antidefamation League, ND, para. 2). Most Antifa members derive
from the “anarchist movement or from the far left,” though since the 2016 presidential
election, some people with more mainstream political backgrounds began to join their
ranks (Antidefamation League, ND, para. 2).
Other Party Affiliations.
Other third-party political affiliations that may be endorsed in the “Other
Party/Affiliation” option in the current study include members of the Independent
American Party, the Libertarian Party, the Green Party, and the Constitution Party. A
concise survey of these parties follows.
The Independent American Party states that their mission is to “promote respect
for life, liberty, and property; strong traditional families; patriotism; and individual, state
and national sovereignty, with a strong reliance on the Declaration of Independence and
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States of America” (IAP, 2016, para. 2).
The Libertarian Party platform states that they “hold that all individuals have the
right to exercise sole dominion over their own lives and have the right to live in whatever
manner they choose, so long as they do not forcibly interfere with the equal right of
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others to live in whatever manner they choose” (p.1). They also advocate a radically
limited size and scope of government (Libertarian National Committee, 2018, p.1).
The Green Party platform proposes a “vision of our common good that is
advanced through independent politics free from the control of corporations and big
money, and through a democratic structure and process that empowers and reaches across
lines of division to bring together our combined strengths as a people,” and “ecological
and economic sustainability, balancing the interests of a regulated market economy and
community-based economics with effective care for the Great Economy in which we are
embedded: the ecosystems of the Earth” (The Green National Committee, 2019, p. 4).
The Constitution Party platform aims to “restore American jurisprudence to its
Biblical foundations and to limit the federal government to its Constitutional boundaries”
(The Constitution Party, 2012, p.1).
Political Polarization
The U.S. is home to more political parties than any other country in the world.
Over the past two decades, there has been a significant rise in political polarization, a
growing inflexibility of positions and attitudes, and a divergence of political beliefs to
ideological extremes (Pew Research Center, 2014). According to a 2014 survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center, the number of Americans on the extremes of the
political spectrum has more than doubled, as the percentage of individuals in the center of
the distribution (moderates) has continued to decrease. This shift represents most
Democrats moving to the left (more liberal) and most Republicans moving to the right
(more conservative), with less overlap between the parties (Pew Research Center, 2014).
In this study, approximately 92% of Republicans fell to the right of the median (an
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increase from 64% in 1994), while 94% of Democrats fell to the left of the median, an
increase from 70% in 1994 (Pew Research Center, 2014). In addition, the study found
that most Republicans and Democrats were further apart ideologically than at any point
in more than two decades, and these divisions were the deepest among those who
identified as being more engaged in the political process (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Conservatives and liberals have declared largely different views on issues related to the
environment/climate change, immigration, gun control, race, sexual orientation, gender
equality, national security, and healthcare (Pew Research Center, 2017). A national
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center tracked 10 measures of political values
since 1994 and determined that the average partisan gap on these political values
increased from 15 to 36 percentage points (2017). From 2013 to 2015 alone, the partisan
gap in political values increased by three points to 36 points, which is considered a
modest increase over a 2-year period; however, the cumulative percentages are a
substantial difference from 1994 (Pew Research Center, 2017). In 2009, a 19-point gap
separated the views of Democrats and Republicans on racial discrimination; by 2017, that
gap had increased to 50 points (Pew Research Center, 2017). In a more recent study
conducted by the Pew Research Center, the average partisan gap was 39 percentage
points across 30 political values encompassing positions on guns, race, immigration,
foreign policy, and other issues (2019). An individual’s identification with a particular
party and ideology based on shared values often becomes a part of their social identity.
Social Identity Theory.
For the current study, various individuals were included from different political
ideologies and party affiliations. In this circumstance, Social Identity Theory (SIT)
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became a valuable means to address the ways in which an individual’s self-concept is
influenced by group memberships, such as political partisanship (Tajfel et al., 1971;
Turner & Tajfel, 1986). Social Identity Theory, first developed by Henri Tajfel and
colleagues, holds that individuals derive their self‐concept from knowledge of their
membership in a particular social group (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social
identities are believed to exert the most influence when individuals consider their
membership as central to their overall self-concept and feel strong emotional ties to the
group (Tajfel, 1978). The theory claims that after individuals internalize their
membership in a group, they attempt to maximize differences between the group with
whom they identify (in-group) and an opposition group (out-group) (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel
& Turner, 1979; Turner & Tajfel, 1986). The SIT also postulates that members of an ingroup often seek negative aspects of an out-group in order to enhance their group selfimage (Tajfel, 1978). The first stage of the SIT is social categorization, which includes
categorizing people by using heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to better understand the
social environment (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Through categorizing in this way,
individuals define appropriate behaviors or norms for each group (Tajfel & Turner,
1979). Hogg et al. (2007) note that "group identification may be a particularly efficient
and immediate way to reduce or fend off uncertainty” (p. 136). Through strong group
identification, one can acquire consensual validation and prototypes (heuristics) that
define who one is and what one should value (Hogg et al., 2007). These heuristics help to
make fast and simplistic decisions, which reduce uncertainty that can promote anxiety
(e.g., "we" are like this, "they" are like that) (Hogg et al., 2007). The use of mental
shortcuts to classify and categorize people can, however, result in one overlooking
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relevant individualized information and instead relying on an available heuristic that
promotes stereotyped and distorted thinking about out-groups (Bigler & Clark, 2014).
Heuristics, though helpful in some circumstances to make sense of one’s environment,
can also contribute to stereotypical and prejudicial thinking (Bigler & Clark, 2014).
The next stage in SIT is known as social identification, a stage in which an
individual adopts the identity of a group by self-categorizing as part of a particular social
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Once categorized into a group, in-group identification,
intergroup differentiation, and perceptual and attitudinal biases result in the third stage
known as social comparison (Tajfel et al., 1971). Individuals’ identities become
intricately linked to the group to which they believe they belong, and their social identity
motivates them to adopt attitudes and behaviors that positively distinguish their in-group
from others (Brewer, 2002). In-group cohesion is also motivated by other basic needs,
including those for inclusiveness, distinctiveness, and certainty, which collectively reduce
anxiety and provide a sense of predictability in an uncertain world (Leonardelli et al.,
2010). Members of ideological groups are motivated to maintain group norms,
perspectives, and interests, as group membership becomes a part of their identity
(Devine, 2015). Group-status threat, defined as the degree of threat or imposition an outgroup is perceived to pose to the in-group, may arise when the perceived competence
and/or integrity of the in-group is in some way devalued by an out-group (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Other constructs stemming from the SIT are the Ideological Conflict
Hypothesis and the Political Group Conflict Hypothesis. According to the Ideological
Conflict Hypothesis, individuals across the political spectrum are prejudiced against
ideologically dissimilar targets or out-groups. In this hypothesis out-group values are
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perceived to be inconsistent/in conflict with an individual’s own group, and therefore
they tend to engage in a variety of strategies to maintain their group’s worldview by
distancing themselves from people who do not share their moral or political convictions
(Brandt et al., 2014). The Political Group Conflict Hypothesis emphasizes that perceived
ideological differences in moral foundations often derive from in-group versus out-group
categorization rather than actual differences in moral foundations (Brandt et al., 2014).
Membership in a political group or ideology is otherwise known as political partisanship.
Political Partisanship.
Political partisanship continues to be the dividing line in the American public’s
political attitudes, surpassing differences in age, race and ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, religious affiliation, and other factors (Pew Research Center, 2019). Political
partisanship has been defined as the political orientation of citizens who stand with a
party; that orientation is psychological regarding identification with the party and
behavioral in the actions of voting and partaking in party activities (Muirhead &
Rosenblum, 2006). Partisanship is also considered a deep psychological attachment to a
particular party, which may include latent biases that motivate an individual to maintain
support for a particular party and the policies of the party’s platform (Cohen, 2003).
Central themes associated with partisanship include a sense of commitment and loyalty to
the party’s values and goals, a sense of community and solidarity fostered by acting
together for a common cause, and an ability to advance one’s cause with civility
(Efthymiou, 2017; Muirhead, 2014). According to Settle et al. (2009), partisanship is
evaluated along two dimensions, namely the strength of partisan attachment and the
direction of the attachment. Strong partisanship often comes with disdain for the political
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opposition or out-group, also known as affect polarization (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017).
Affect polarization in combination with the inherently competitive nature of partisanship
have been linked to prejudicial behavior (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017).
Partisanship has demonstrated a strong influence on political behavior. According
to a meta-analysis that synthesized a total of 182 effects of perceived injustice, efficacy,
and identity on collective action, a strong partisanship was associated with collective action
and related forms of group-based political activity (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In this
study, collective action was defined as “the attitudinal support for protest as well as the
protest intentions or behaviors of members of a social group that are directed at removing
the perceived underlying causes of the group’s disadvantage or problem” (Van Zomeren et
al., 2008, p. 512). Most of the studies included in the meta-analysis relied on proxies for
collective action, such as attitudes toward collective action (supporting or opposing
collective action) and professed intentions to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren et
al., 2008). Individuals with strong partisan identification have been shown to act as a means
of defending or enhancing their party’s political position, as their partisan identity becomes
internalized to the degree that the group’s failures are perceived as personal failures (Huddy
& Bankert, 2017). Hostility has been demonstrated to emerge when strong emotions, such
as fear, are attached to the out-group, compounding a powerful identification with an ingroup (Mackie et al., 2000). According to Mason and Kalmoe (2019), after aggressiveness,
“partisan identity strength,” as measured by a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrat
to strong Republican, is the second most predictive factor in endorsing violence.
Partisanship has been shown to intensify over the course of a person’s lifetime, as a result
of individuals having more opportunity to become active in their community and to
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socialize with groups (Campbell et al., 1960). The expressive model of partisanship
postulates that partisans become motivated to defend their party’s positions, which often
results in biased processing of information that generates attitude stability and buttresses
political beliefs (Huddy et al., 2015). According to Westfall et al. (2015), individuals with
stronger partisan identification as Democrat or Republican also tend to perceive greater
polarization between the parties.
Social identifications, such as political partisanship, have demonstrated the
capacity to produce in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in attitudes,
perceptions, and behaviors when those groups are in competition (Hewstone et al., 2002).
Individuals who identify strongly with a group (Democrat or Republican) have
additionally been found to feel emotions more intensely than less committed individuals
in response to threat and reassurance (Combs et al., 2009). In four studies using
undergraduate populations, participants gave their emotional reactions to news articles
describing misfortunes happening to others (e.g., poor economic news and house
foreclosures; Combs et al., 2009). When reverses befell political opponents of the party
with which they strongly identified, participants experienced schadenfreude, pleasure or
lack of empathy in reaction to those misfortunes (Combs et al., 2009). Overall, party
affiliation and the intensity of in-group identification have proven to accurately predict
whether these events produced schadenfreude (Combs et al., 2009). Kalmoe and Mason
(2019) also found that partisan identity strength was a significant positive predictor for
political hostility toward opponents regarding all three components of lethal partisanship.
Lethal partisanship includes moral disengagement (rationalizing harm to opponents),
partisan schadenfreude, and partisan violence (Kalmoe & Mason, 2019). Moral
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disengagement involves making extremely rigid judgements that dehumanize and blame
out-groups, while minimizing or misrepresenting the extent of the harm done (Kalmoe &
Mason, 2019). Moral disengagement has been shown to be significantly more associated
with partisan strength than the other two components of lethal partisanship (Kalmoe &
Mason, 2019).
Associations have also been identified between partisan strength and anger
reactivity to threat (Huddy et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Huddy et al. (2015)
had required respondents to read an experimentally altered blog entry from actual
political blogs that promised electoral victory or warned of electoral defeat for the
respondent’s party. After reading the blog entry, respondents were asked to answer six
questions about the intensity of the emotions that they may have felt while reading it:
angry, hostile, disgusted (anger), hopeful, proud, and enthusiastic. The intensity of those
feelings was rated on a 4-point Likert scale (a great deal, some, a little, not at all)
(Huddy et al., 2015). Results indicated that participants with strong partisan identification
displayed more anger than those with weaker partisan identification at the prospect of
electoral loss (Huddy et al., 2015). A parallel result was discovered among Frenchspeaking students at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium (Yzerbyt et al.,
2003). For half of the participants, written instructions made very explicit that the study
aimed at comparing the opinions of students and those of professors, making their
identification as a student more salient. For the other half of the participants, the
instructions unambiguously indicated that the study aimed at comparing the opinions of
the students at UCL with students at other universities and they were explicitly asked to
indicate the university they attended. Moreover, a national newspaper had recently
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published an article about a new mandate requiring third- and fourth-year students at
another university to speak English (Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Emotional reactions of anger
and associated offensive action tendencies were prevalent when participants came to
regard the victims (those required to speak English) and themselves as part of the same
group, and when they strongly identified with this group (Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Overall,
the study concluded that participants facing a context in which the distinct memberships
of themselves and the victims were emphasized reported feeling more anger than any
other emotion. Additionally, the study concluded that the impact of an emotional event is
more pronounced among high identifiers than among low identifiers only when a
common membership is made salient by the categorization context. Group-based anger
also demonstrated the capacity to increase commitment to political action, such as
opposing government intentions to redress past wrongs against out-groups (Leach et al.,
2007). In this study, group actions included willingness to help organize a demonstration,
send a letter of protest to the government/media, and vote for a political candidate who
shares their view (Leach et al., 2007). One aspect of political partisanship that is
particularly important to this study is partisan bias.
Partisan bias
As previously noted, survey data have indicated growing ideological opposition
between partisans of the two major parties over the last two decades (Pew Research
Center, 2014). One explanation for this increased political polarization is partisan bias, a
general tendency for people to think or act in ways that unwittingly benefit their own
political group or present their ideological beliefs in a more favorable light (Ditto et al.,
2019). According to Lilienfeld et al. (2009), the bias most pivotal to ideological
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extremism and inter- and intragroup conﬂict is conﬁrmation bias. This form of bias
entails the tendency to seek out information that affirms the views of an individual’s
identification and to avoid information that may challenge those views (Abramowitz &
Sauders, 2008). Confirmation bias can lead those individuals to draw distorted
conclusions (cognitions) regarding evidence that runs counter to the views of the
individual and their party (Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Although confirmation bias in milder
forms is common in everyday life, extreme forms of this bias can contribute to
ideological certainty, ideological fanaticism, and the irrefutable authority of one’s
opinion (Calhoun, 2004). Confirmation bias is predicted by belief superiority, which has
demonstrated its prominence among extremists on both ends of the political spectrum
(Toner et al., 2013). According to Toner et al. (2013), those who identify as “very liberal”
are just as likely to believe in the superiority of their views on a range of topics, such as
healthcare, abortion, immigration, taxes, affirmative action, and the use of torture on
suspected terrorists, as those who identify as “very conservative.” Regarding the concept
of partisan bias, two competing hypotheses have come to the fore: The asymmetry
hypothesis predicts greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals, and the
symmetry hypothesis predicts equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives
(Ditto et al., 2019). In a meta-analysis including 51 experimental studies and 18,000
participants, the symmetry hypothesis garnered stronger support, with no differences
found between liberals and conservatives in mean levels of biases across different
methodological variations and political topics (Ditto et al., 2019). Moreover, van Proojen
and Krouwel (2017) found that compared to moderates, both left- and right-wing Dutch
extremists, as measured on a 10-point ideological scale from 1 (very left wing) to 10 (very
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right wing), displayed strong dogmatic intolerance, a tendency to reject and consider
inferior any ideological belief that differs from their own. Another cognitive bias
associated with partisan bias is naive realism, the tendency to believe that the world is
exactly as one sees it (Ross & Ward, 1996). Naive realism is considered a significant
contributor to ideological extremism and a barrier to reconciling tension between ingroups and out-groups. (Lilienfield et al., 2009). Cognitive Dissonance Theory explains
how these cognitive biases are perpetuated within groups.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957) claims that individuals have an
inner drive to share attitudes and behavior in harmony and to avoid disharmony
(dissonance). Individuals wish to reduce or avoid cognitive dissonance, a state
characterized by inconsistent thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes (Festinger, 1957).
Experiencing this state of inconsistency results in tension, or uncomfortable
psychological arousal, which can be resolved by changing beliefs or behaviors so that
they are more consistent (Festinger, 1957). For example, individuals prefer and seek out
pro-attitudinal over counter-attitudinal information through engaging in selective
exposure (Metzger et al., 2015; Stroud, 2010). In the context of political ideology,
Cognitive Dissonance Theory emphasizes that people experience positive feelings when
presented with information that confirms thoughts, beliefs, and decisions about their
group and avoid information that may induce cognitive dissonance (Frimer et al., 2017).
Liberals and conservatives have displayed similar aversions to learning about the
views of ideological opponents, anticipating that exposure to opposing views might
induce cognitive dissonance and damage their relationship with the individual holding
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differing views (Frimer et al., 2017). Frimer et al. (2017) found that in a sample of 202
Americans, two-thirds of the participants in their study passed up the chance to win extra
money to avoid hearing from the opposing side on topics including same-sex marriage,
elections, marijuana legalization, climate change, guns, and abortion. Conversely, by
reinforcing their partisan beliefs through viewing clips that conveyed parallel beliefs,
individuals consolidated their ideological positions, making them more resistant to
counter-attitudinal information (Levendusky, 2013).
This tendency toward confirmation bias is particularly evident in individuals
exhibiting extreme partisanship (Levendusky, 2013). Congruent with cognitive
dissonance theory and confirmation bias, the definition of partisan bias includes the
tendency to evaluate otherwise neutral information more favorably when it supports
one’s political beliefs or allegiances than when the same neutral information challenges
those beliefs or allegiances (Ditto et al., 2019). Research has demonstrated that
individuals with partisan bias have an implicit preference for policies proposed by a
member of their political in-group, regardless of whether the policies’ content accords
with their ideology (Cohen, 2003). Overall, since 2006 partisan selective exposure has
increased across the political spectrum in relation to current trends in political
polarization (Rodriguez et al., 2017; Stroud, 2010). Rodriguez et al. (2017) found that
Republicans engaged in more partisan selective exposure to homogenous media over time
than their Democratic counterparts (Mdiff = 0.129, t(14476) = 5.90, Cohen’s d = 0.111),
with individuals identifying as very conservative displaying a steeper increase in partisan
selective exposure than any other group. Very Conservative respondents exhibited
significantly greater levels of selective exposure than all other groups, including Liberal
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(Mdiff = .343, t(4913) = 7.37, Cohen’s d = .270) and Very Liberal participants (Mdiff =
.292, t(2668) = 5.19, Cohen’s d = .230). However, persons identifying as conservative
exhibited lower levels of selective exposure than all other groups (Rodriguez et al.,
2017). According to Lavine et al. (2005), in the presence of threat, individuals scoring
high in authoritarianism as measured by the RWA Scale were significantly more
interested in exposure to uniformly pro‐attitudinal arguments, and significantly less
interested in balanced two‐sided arguments. In a study using data from the National
Annenberg Election Survey, results indicated that over time, partisans’ selective exposure
to media leads to greater polarization (Stroud, 2010
System Justification Theory
System Justification Theory builds upon the cognitive dissonance framework. It
emphasizes that an individual will justify a social system in order to retain a positive
image of that system and will attempt to maintain the status quo because the individual
plays a role in perpetuating that system (Jost et al., 2004). The theory argues that people
are actively motivated to justify social, political, and economic arrangements to which
they belong to maintain a positive perception of the group and their role within it (Jost et
al., 2004). System Justification Theory operates as a powerful motive, because it satisfies
fundamental social and psychological needs for consistency, certainty, and meaning (Jost
& van der Toorn, 2012). It also satisfies existential needs to manage threat and anxiety, as
well as relational needs to create a shared reality with others (Jost & van der Toorn,
2012). This theory is particularly relevant when investigating individuals who identify
strongly with a particular ideological group to justify their rigidity, which maintains ingroup norms and legitimizes behaviors towards out-groups (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012).
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In addition to cognitive dissonance theory and system justification theory, the media has
played a significant role in explaining and perpetuating group bias.
The Role of the Media
Traditional media
Communication media employ an array of technological processes that facilitate
communication between the sender of a message and the recipient of that message
(Croteau & Hoynes, 2019). Traditional communication media include television, film,
newspaper, radio, books, and magazines (Croteau & Hoynes, 2019). The media play a
significant role in how individuals acquire information, form political opinions, and
debate positions. In general, information that is most easily retrieved from memory tends
to most exert influence on judgements, opinions, and decisions (Iyengar, 1990). As a
vehicle for public discourse, the media often influences salient issues, sets agendas, and
controls representation (Bail, 2012). According to the availability heuristic, information
that is most frequently or most recently viewed in the media is more accessible
information for individuals (Iyengar, 1990). Many studies have highlighted the influence
that exposure to different forms of media can have on attitudes towards one’s own and
other groups (Arendt & Temple, 2015; Meeusen & Jacobs, 2015; Park et al., 2007; Lee,
2007; Vergeer et al., 2000). For example, using an Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT) to
measure implicit attitudes, and a feeling thermometer asking participants whether
participants felt general coolness/negativity or warmth/positivity toward African
Americans to measure explicit attitudes, Arendt and Temple (2015) found that increased
exposure to stereotyped television news altered both implicit and explicit attitudes.
Regarding implicit attitudes, local television news had a small but significant effect of on
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the negativity of implicit attitudes (Arendt & Temple, 2015). Moreover, stereotyped news
coverage affected explicit attitudes, albeit to a small degree, through its impact on
implicit attitudes (r = 0.003, p = .025; Arendt & Temple, 2015). Vergeer et al. (2000)
similarly found that exposure to newspapers characterized by negative reporting about
crime perpetrated by ethnic minorities led readers to perceive ethnic minorities as a
greater threat.
Research has also shown that on television news, a negative tone of voice in
references to minorities (e.g., LGBT, Jews, Eastern Europeans, and North Africans) was
associated with greater prejudice by those watching the program, while a positive tone
was associated with less prejudice (Meeusen & Jacobs, 2015). Non-white ethnic
minorities, such as African Americans, Asians, and Latinos are often misrepresented and
negatively depicted in the media (Greenberg, 2000; Jakubowicz, 2003). Park et al. (2007)
provided evidence for the malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. According
to Park et al. (2007), implicit and explicit anti-Arab prejudice were moderated when
participants were exposed to positive and negative information about Arab Muslims prior
to an IAT task. Ramasubramanian (2007) additionally found that a combination of an
audience-centered approach that explicitly instructs audiences to be critical media
consumers prior to exposure and message-centered approaches involving stereotype
debunking and counter-stereotypical news stories can reduce the influence of racial
stereotypes activated by news stories.
New Media
According to Graber and Dunaway (2018), the expansion of cable television in
the 1980s and of the Internet in the 2000s opened more options for media consumers than
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ever before. In this age of “new media,” more people are seeking political information
online and through social media, with these trends only accelerating as mobile access to
the internet continues to grow and improve. In 2015, 99 out of 110 major news outlets
had more mobile web visitors than desktop web visitors, and mobile use has only
continued to increase over time (Lu & Holcomb, 2016).
Despite the potential for social media to enable people to consume more
heterogeneous sources of information about current events, the tendency to form social
network ties with those who are similar, or homophily, can lead to social media having an
even more polarizing effect (McPherson et al., 2001). Though social media provides a
plethora of options for obtaining heterogeneous information, individuals have been
shown to be more likely to read stories that affirm their existing views than stories that
oppose their views (Bakshy et al., 2015). This tendency can result in media partisan echo
chambers, a phenomenon in which individuals are exposed only to information from likeminded individuals that reinforce existing perspectives and foster confirmation biases
(Garrett, 2009). Excessive use of the internet for social networking, searching for
information, and using online media have been found to be associated with more frequent
distorted thinking, as measured by the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (Morris, 2011).
In a behavior‐tracking study comprising 727 participants from two partisan online news
sites, participants consistently sought out information in support of their own opinions,
while exhibiting an aversion to opinion‐challenging information, as measured by not
endorsing interest and opting not to read dissonant articles (Garrett, 2009). This tendency
conforms with Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, in which people
experience positive feelings when presented with information that confirms that their
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decisions/beliefs are correct. Based on principles of social learning theory and operant
conditioning, this reinforcement is likely to increase further engagement in selective
exposure behavior.
While the internet was initially perceived to be a source of easily accessible
information, it is increasingly used as a means of promoting biased narratives labeled
fake news (Tornberg, 2018). According to Silverman and Singer-Vine (2016), 75% of
Americans are likely to be deceived by fake news, information deliberately created to
misinform readers (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Individuals who rely on superficial
information processing, quite common in political cognition as noted above, are most
vulnerable to the effects of fake news (Metzger et al., 2010). Motivated social cognition,
a social phenomenon explaining the influence of motives on various thought processes,
such as memory, information processing, reasoning, judgment, and decision making, is
also believed to be a factor contributing to the effects fake news has on political
partisanship (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Partisan-motivated reasoning refers to the
greater likelihood of accepting information that is consistent with one’s attitudes and
ideologies as strong and convincing, and the corresponding likelihood of rejecting
contradictory information as weak or invalid (Lewandowskey et al., 2013). Both
Democrats and Republicans are disposed to evaluate information as more credible when
it comes from sources that share the same ideology (Hayes et al., 2018). A recent study
conducted by the Pew Research Center found that highly engaged partisans are extremely
polarized in their confidence in news sources (2020).
According to Pew Research Center (2020), in the past five years partisan
polarization in the use and trust of media has continued to grow. Republicans distrusted
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20 of the 30 sources included in the study, while Democrats expressed trust in 22 of the
30 sources (Pew Research Center, 2020). Democrats and Independents who lean
Democratic saw most of the sources as credible and relied on them to a far greater degree
than Republicans, according to the survey of 12,043 Americans (Pew Research Center,
2020). Republicans chose only seven outlets that generated more trust than distrust,
including Fox News and the talk radio programs of hosts Sean Hannity and Rush
Limbaugh (Pew Research Center, 2020). For Democrats, the numbers were reversed,
with most Democrats distrusting only eight outlets, including Fox News (77%) and
Limbaugh (55%) (Pew Research Center, 2020). A comparison to a 2014 study indicated
that Republican’s distrust has intensified in the last five years for 15 sources, most
notably CNN, The Washington Post, and The New York Times (Pew Research Center,
2020). Republicans in the study displayed less trust in news sources and were also the
least inclined to consult these sources (Pew Research Center, 2020). In the study, 65% of
Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents trusted Fox News as their sole source
of news, in what the Pew Research Center termed “The Fox News phenomenon” (2020).
In a study of a community sample of 214 individuals, Republicans and other participants
who relied on Fox News as their main source of news were more Islamophobic,
operationalized as a score on the Perceived Islamophobia Scale, than Democrats,
Liberaltarians, individuals who relied on CNN, and individuals who relied on a news
source other than Fox News (Ghuman, 2015). Moreover, about one-fifth of those of both
Republicans and Democrats inhabited an isolated media bubble in which they received
political news in a given week only from outlets used predominantly by people who
aligned with them politically (Pew Research Center, 2020). Relying on one source of
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political information/news serves to increase distorted thinking; having only one source
of information reinforces pre-existing beliefs and denies access to alternative perspectives
on the news. According to a 2018 Pew Research Center study, Democrats and
Democratic-leaning Independents (17%) were more likely to change their views based on
social media content compared to Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents
(9%). In general, this selective exposure to like-minded content has increased attitude
extremity and polarization (Stroud, 2010).
Exacerbation of Animosity.
In addition to a more unyielding partisan divide than ever recorded before, with
new peaks of opposition on fundamental political values, a significant increase has
emerged in mutually negative views of the opposition at both ends of the political
spectrum, with 81% of Democrats and Republicans perceiving the other party in
unfavorable ways (Pew Research Center, 2017). A 2019 study found that the share of
Republicans who give Democrats a cold rating has risen 14% since 2016, with 57% of
Democrats reciprocating, up from 41% (Pew Research Center, 2019). In a 2016 Pew
Research Center study, more than half of Democrats (55%) endorsed that the Republican
Party makes them “afraid,” with 49% of Republicans endorsing the same fear of the
Democratic Party. In addition, 47% of Democrats and 46% of Republicans expressed
anger, and 58% of Democrats and 57% of Republicans endorsed frustration towards their
counterparts (Pew Research Center, 2016). Regarding perceptions of threat, 45% of
Republicans viewed Democratic policies as a threat, an increase of 8% from 2014 (Pew
Research Center, 2016); 41% of Democrats perceived Republican policies as a threat, an
increase of 10% from 2014 (Pew Research Center, 2016). Furthermore, most Democrats
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characterized Republicans as being more closed-minded than other Americans (75%),
with the same holding true for Republicans regarding Democrats (64%; Pew Research
Center, 2016). Most Republicans in the 2016 study expressed a belief that Democrats are
more unpatriotic (63%) and immoral (55%) than other Americans, while most Democrats
(70%) perceived Republicans as more immoral (35%), lazy (18%), and dishonest (42%)
than other Americans (Pew Research Center, 2016). Roughly half of the Republicans
included in the survey (52%) viewed Democrats as closed-minded, immoral (47%), lazy
(46%), and dishonest (45%). This rise in negative attitudes, intolerance of out-groups,
and outright animosity continues to increase at concerning rates. Social Dominance
Theory proposes an explanation for the trend in animosity.
Social Dominance Theory
The Social Dominance Theory argues that intergroup oppression, discrimination,
and prejudice are how human societies organize themselves as group-based hierarchies
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). One reason that group-based dominance hierarchies are stable
is that they legitimize ideologies and help to coordinate beliefs, actions, and institutional
practices that maintain hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Group-based social
hierarchies consist of three discrete stratification systems, including an age system, in
which middle-aged individuals hold the most power, a gender or patriarchal system, in
which men hold more power, and an arbitrary-set system, which involves socially
constructed categories that are hierarchically arranged (Van Lange et al., 2012). Social
dominance orientation is a construct that stems from this theory (Pratto et al.,1994). The
construct measures a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations that
expresses the goal of establishing and maintaining in-group dominance, power, and
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superiority (Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is an important measure,
because it shows that people’s general feelings about social inequality can predict their
beliefs about whether their own group should dominate other groups (e.g., nationalism)
and their endorsement of specific social policies such as capital punishment (Pratto et al.,
1994). This construct has demonstrated a correlation with deeper prejudice against outgroups and right-wing authoritarianism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Right-Wing Authoritarianism.
The study of authoritarianism stems back to World War II, when social
psychologists undertook to explain the seemingly blind obedience to authority that led to
the war and the Holocaust. Their goal was to theorize about how people became
prejudiced, dogmatic, and intolerant of others (Zmigrod, 2020). Adorno et al. (1950) was
the first to describe the concept of an Authoritarian Personality (AP) in an attempt to
explain how antisemitism gained popularity in Europe before and during the Holocaust.
Adorno and his colleagues used various psychological scales as a means of trying to
explain racism, including the Adorno F-Scale, a means of measuring fascist tendencies
(Adorno et al., 1950). According to Adorno et al. (1950), elements of the AP are blind
allegiance to conventional beliefs about what is right and wrong, respect for and
submission to an identified authority, a belief that aggression is warranted against those
who do not subscribe to conventional thinking (outgroups), and a negative view of people
in general. Additional elements of the AP include a need for strong leadership that
displays uncompromising power, a belief in simple answers, a resistance to creative ideas
that are perceived as dangerous, a tendency to project feelings of inadequacy, rage, and
fear onto an outgroup, and a preoccupation with violence and sex (Adorno et al., 1950).
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Authoritarianism demands a strict adherence to hierarchy and dominance over
subordinates (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Stenner, 2009). According to
Adorno et al. (1950), authoritarians also tend to view the world in rigid, black-and-white,
absolutist terms (e.g., good or evil); which is a type of cognitive distortion. For many
years, authoritarianism was believed to be more strongly associated with individuals who
identified as conservative.
Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) was introduced by Robert Altemeyer
(1981), based on Adorno’s AP. Altemeyer’s research found that only three of the original
nine elements of Adorno’s AP correlated as key predictors of prejudice, racism, and
right-wing extremism (1981). The components found to predict prejudice, racism, and
right-wing extremism were authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and
authoritarian conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). Authoritarian submission entails
submission to authorities who are perceived as legitimately established in society
(Adorno et al., 1950). Authoritarian aggressiveness entails aggression directed against
individuals perceived as threats by those authorities (Adorno et al., 1950). Lastly,
authoritarian conventionalism is the tendency to accept and obey social conventions and
the rules of authorities (Adorno et al., 1950). Altemeyer (1981) additionally found
associations between right-wing authoritarianism and faulty reasoning, hostility towards
out-groups, and blindness to one’s personal failings. Altemeyer argues that those who
score high in right-wing authoritarianism using his RWA Scale “see the world as a
dangerous place” and that fear appears to “instigate aggression” (1998). Those scoring
high in right wing authoritarianism also demonstrated an inclination to view the world
and diverse “others'' as threatening (Duckitt & Sibley, 2016). According to Dunwoody
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and Plane (2019), ideology and partisanship are moderately correlated with
authoritarianism, with those who are more conservative and more strongly Republican
being more likely to score higher in authoritarianism as measured by the RWA Scale.
Following Adorno, researchers have continued to offer numerous competing
theories of authoritarianism over the last several decades. According to Rokeach (1960),
authoritarianism is not specific to political conservatives, and instead conceptualized the
AP as an identifiable species of general cognitive rigidity that occurs in the face of
ideological threat, which he termed dogmatism. In contrast, Stenner (2009) argued that
authoritarianism reflects an intolerance of difference and/or a need for social uniformity
that manifests in response to disruption of social norms. He asserted that the construct of
authoritarianism is a “principal determinant of intolerance of difference across time and
space, and domain,” which includes “all cultures and every aspect including racial,
political, and moral intolerance” (Stenner, 2009, p. 142). Overall, agreement has evolved
concerning some core aspects of the construct of authoritarianism; however, differences
persist regarding how this construct manifests across the left and right (Costello et al.,
2020). Although right-wing authoritarianism is more widely accepted, in recent years
left-wing authoritarianism has been a topic of discussion in the fields of social and
political psychology.
Left-Wing Authoritarianism.
Left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is the idea that liberals engage in the same
reliance on simple authority and psychological rigidity as their conservative counterparts
(Conway et al., 2018). A growing body of research has identified core markers of
authoritarianism in both the left and right, notably dogmatism, cognitive rigidity,
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prejudice, and lethal partisanship (Costello et al., 2020; Ditto et al., 2019; Kalmoe &
Mason, 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2020). This psychological portrait of authoritarianism is
largely interchangeable with conservatism, although researchers continue to minimize the
existence and importance of LWA (Costello et al., 2020). Many in the field of social
psychology contend that LWA does not exist, and that concepts such as authoritarianism
and dogmatism do not consistently apply to individuals who identify as left of the
political center (Altemeyer, 1998; Jost et al., 2003; Stone, 1980).
For instance, Altemeyer (1996) claimed that he was unable to find the presence of
LWA, because “if there ever were any, most of them dried up and have blown
away...You don't have to be much of a weatherman to know which way the wind has
been blowing for the past 25 years” (p. 229). However, Conway (2020) suggested that
continued skepticism of LWA is partially “due to very reasonable concerns over the
double-barreled nature of LWA measurement” (slide 27). Because LWA measures
ideology and authoritarianism simultaneously, some researchers have argued that is it
difficult to know whether effects are due to ideology or authoritarianism (Conway, 2020).
Conway (2020) claimed that “the nature of the construct is inherently double-barreled”; if
you are measuring LWA, you are measuring people who are left-wing and authoritarian
and if you are measuring RWA, you are measuring people who are right-wing and
authoritarian (slide 30-31). In consequence, Conway (2020) argued that authoritarianism
itself is domain-specific, in that authoritarians likely “submit to a specific set of authority
figures while excluding or denouncing others” (slide 32). Compared to the construct of
RWA, there is significantly less research on LWA, with only 635 returns on Google
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Scholar compared to 12,700 for right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Conway et al. 2018;
Costello et al., 2020).
Until recently, the construct of authoritarianism was more likely to be detected in
right-wing conservatives than left-wing liberals due to the construction of measures;
however, more recent research maintains that individuals identifying on the left of the
political spectrum are also likely to hold authoritarian beliefs. For instance, Costello et al.
(2020) cite such examples of left-wing authoritarianism as, “the Stalinist Soviet Union,
the Kim dynasty’s totalitarian rule of North Korea, perhaps even the French Reign of
Terror” (Ezrow & Frangz, 2011, in Costello et al., 2020, p. 11). This more recent research
posits that the earlier studies failed to detect LWA, and that problems with methodology
likely explain these false-negative findings (Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2020;
Van Hiel et al., 2006). For example, one serious methodological problem identified in
earlier research was that definitions of authoritarianism generally operationalized and
conflated authoritarian beliefs almost exclusively with right-wing beliefs, without
reciprocally including left-wing authoritarian beliefs that might explain the authoritarian
character of the left-leaning regimes cited above.
For instance, the right-wing desire to preserve the current power/governmental
structures and the left-wing desire to overthrow the current democratically elected
power/governmental structure are both thought to evince anti-democratic
authoritarianism. This is the case because both groups hope to accomplish their political
goals independent of, or even in opposition to results of democratic elections. Because
the original studies accurately measured these authoritarian tendencies on the right but
failed to assess them on the left meant that the operational definitions were biased to the
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right and created a self-fulfilling prophecy, finding RWA and failing to find LWA in
their samples. The failure to define authoritarian tendencies on the left meant that it could
not be measured, leading to results of limited validity and, perhaps, false negatives
(Costello et al., 2020).
Using the LWA Scale for Flemish samples, Van Hiel et al. (2006), was able to
find evidence of LWA in extreme leftists, though like other researchers, they struggled to
find evidence of LWA in ordinary populations. Van Hiel et al. (2006) concluded that
despite the construct of LWA being more difficult to find compared to RWA,
authoritarianism was detectable in individuals who identified on the extreme left of the
political spectrum. Using the Left-Wing Authoritarian Scale, adapted to parallel
Altemeyer’s (1998) Right-Wing Authoritarian Scale, Conway et al. (2018) concluded that
the political left was just as likely to be prejudiced, dogmatic, and extreme as their
political right counterparts (RWA: r = .59, LWA, r = .50). The measure was specifically
designed by Conway et al. (2018) to capture LWA in ordinary samples in the U.S. The
original sample consisted of 475 undergraduate students from the University of Montana
and 298 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. After sorting participants
into conservatives and liberals, Conway et al. (2018) found that the highest scores for
authoritarianism were for liberals using the LWA Scale. In arguing for the symmetry
hypothesis regarding authoritarianism, Conway (2020) explained that symmetry does not
(necessarily) mean that liberals and conservatives will have proportionally equal numbers
of authoritarians. He instead argued that “symmetry means that we can consistently
identify people on both the right and left that are truly authoritarian.” Conway et al.
(2020) has since conducted twelve studies including over 8,000 participants in the U.S.
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and over 66,000 participants worldwide that indicated LWA was a viable construct that
can predict real-world phenomena using the LWA Scale. The studies found that both
liberal and conservative Americans claimed knowledge of left-wing authoritarians from
personal experience and that both liberals and conservatives considered the LWA Scale
as a valid measure of authoritarianism (Conway et al., 2020). Conway et al. (2020) also
found that the LWA scale consistently predicted threat sensitivity, restrictive
communication norms, negative ratings of minority groups, and dogmatism.
According to Costello et al. (2020) there has been a “blind spot” for the construct
of LWA and previous measures of LWA were insufficient in that they either mirrored the
tripartite conceptualization (submission, general aggressiveness, and conventionalism) of
the authoritarianism of the RWA scale or were developed to be ideologically neutral by
eliminating conservative and religious content from the RWA Scale without properly
understanding LWA characteristics. This conceptualization stems back to the seminal
work of Adorno et al. (1950), who established the authoritarian personality to explain the
psychological appeal of the far-right ideology of fascism, with the original focus on
explaining the rise of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust, and fascists’ seemingly blind
obedience to authority. Adorno’s conceptualization has been attacked as flawed in its
original conceptualization of authoritarianism; it gathered data on RWA and developed a
measure to detect RWA and RWA only, which was labeled authoritarianism. Politically
authoritarian conservatism is characterized as favoring absolutist forms of government
and weaponizing the present dominant hierarchy but favoring absolutist forms of
government yet believing that the present dominant hierarchy should be overthrown, if
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necessary, by violent, undemocratic means, are among left-wing characteristics excluded
from Adorno’s conceptualization of authoritarianism (Costello et al., 2020).
Altemeyer (1996) modified Adorno’s theory by conceptualizing LWA as
authoritarianism in individuals who oppose established hierarchies of moral and practical
authority. He provided the first published measure of LWA, entitled the Left-Wing
Authoritarianism Scale paralleling RWA dimensions, including LWA submission (a high
degree of submission to authorities who are dedicated to overthrowing the established
authorities), LWA aggression (general aggressiveness directed to established authorities
or individuals that support the established authorities), and LWA conventionalism (a high
degree of adherence to the forms of behavior perceived to be advocated by the
revolutionary authorities; Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer concluded that he had “yet to find
a single ‘socialist/Communist type’ who scores highly (in absolute terms) on the [leftwing authoritarianism] Scale'' (Altemeyer, 1998, p.71). He argued that LWA was nonexistent after finding that subjects rarely scored above the midpoint of the scale
(Altemeyer, 1996). Costello et al. (2020), however, argued that “there is little reason to
consider the scale’s midpoint meaningful.” According to Costello et al. (2020),
individuals who score highly on the LWA scale “would score well below the midpoint on
a scale marked by levels of extreme item difficulty” (p. 11). Costello et al. (2020) further
explained that Altemeyer’s RWA Scale is “far less extreme in comparison” to the items
on his LWA Scale, which would explain why many scored below the midpoint. For
example, item 12 on Altemeyer’s LWA Scale reads “the members of the Establishment
deserve to be dealt with harshly, without mercy, when they are finally overthrown,” while
the RWA scale reads “the only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, PARTISAN STRENGTH AND AUTHORITARIANISM

46

back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the
troublemakers spreading bad ideas” (Altemeyer, 1996). Conway (2020) similarly argues
that to score high on Altemeyer’s LWA Scale, you would “basically agree to join a
militia designed to overthrow the government,” and to score high on his RWA scale, the
implications are far less extreme. Conway (2020) argued that Altemeyer (1996)
“basically stacked the decks against LWA” by not including items parallel to his RWA
scale. Concerning the Conway et al. (2018)’s LWA Scale, Costello et al. (2020)
acknowledged that the measure “offers preliminary evidence that LWA may be present in
US samples.” However, because it directly parallels Altemeyer's RWA Scale, it “does not
allow for the possibility that the tripartite conceptualization of authoritarianism is
insufficient for capturing LWA” (p. 12).
Costello et al. (2020) sought to account for the possibility that previous
conceptualizations of LWA and RWA overlooked key aspects of authoritarianism.
Regarding measures that have been developed to be ideologically neutral, Costello et al.
(2020) proposed that without first developing an independent measure of LWA that
contrasts with RWA, LWA cannot be reliably measured, much less compared to RWA
quantitatively. Conway et al. (2018) also argued that value-neutral measurements can
contain loaded responses that predetermine a conclusion. In light of such objections,
Costello et al. (2020) argued for a ground-up reconceptualization of LWA, starting with
an expansive view of the concept that drew upon a systematic empirical exploration,
rather than previously used deductive methods (Costello et al., 2020). Investigating 65
criteria-related variables across five community samples, Costello et al. (2020) found
shared traits in left- and right-wing authoritarianism including social conformity,
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prejudice towards out-groups, willingness to accept group authority to coerce behavior,
cognitive rigidity, aggression, and punitive\action against perceived threats. Other shared
traits of an emphasis on hierarchy and moral absolutism were found in both left- and
right-wing authoritarians (Costello et al., 2020).
Costello et al. (2020) defined conventionalism in this context as “the rejection of
traditional values, a moral absolutism concerning progressive values, and concomitant
dismissal of conservatives as inherently immoral” (p. 36). So defined, conventionalism is
a source of authoritarianism on the political left. Antihierarchical aggression, defined as
“a belief that those currently in power should be punished, the established order should
be overthrown, and extreme actions such as political violence are justifiable” was
identified as another characteristic of left-wing authoritarians (p. 36). RWA was more
strongly related than LWA to cognitive rigidity, as measured by the Objectivism Scale,
and resistance to openness, as measured by the HEXACO Personality Inventory.
Emotionality, as measured by the HEXACO Personality Inventory, was higher for LWA
than RWA. These personality findings are similar NEO-PI-R results, ascribing lower
openness to conservatives and higher neuroticism (emotionality) to liberals.
Studies on authoritarianism in formerly communist societies are limited, dated,
and have inconsistent findings. Larsen et al. (1993) found that in some former communist
states (e.g., Bulgaria and Hungary), respondents scored higher on authoritarianism, as
measured by the 18-item Authoritarian Scale of Adorno et al. (1950) than did samples
from the United States. Also using Adorno’s Authoritarian Scale, McFarland et al. (1992)
and Altemeyer (1996) found that participants from the Soviet Union were, on average,
less authoritarian than Americans from selected states, specifically Kentucky and New
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Mexico. Altemeyer (1996) found that authoritarians from Moscow and from the United
States harbored similar nationalistic attitudes, illustrating that authoritarianism is not
necessarily tied to the specific conservative ideologies found in the West. Although
national identification often confers benefits, how people identify with their nation has
important consequences for intergroup relations (Osborne et al., 2017). Nationalism
reflects a people’s belief in the superiority of their nation and a desire for its dominance
in the international community (Rothi et al., 1989). According to Osborne et al. (2017),
RWA as measured by Altemeyer’s RWA Scale had positive cross-lagged effects on
nationalism as measured by Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) patriotism/nationalism
questionnaire administered to a New Zealand population (B = 0.114, 95%; CI = [0.080,
0.146]; p < .001). The finding that RWA was positively associated with national identity
corroborated recent work demonstrating that RWA captures people’s motivation for ingroup cohesion and support for prevailing social norms, or at least the association of the
two constructs (Osborne et al., 2017).
Conway et al. (2015) observed that the same processes that create
authoritarianism in right-wing individuals also exist in left-wing individuals to an equal
degree if researchers ask the appropriate questions. Conway et al. (2020) later found that
individuals who score high on the LWA scale possess the traits associated with models of
authoritarianism (while controlling for political ideology). LWA is positively related to
threat sensitivity across multiple domains, including general ecological threats. HighLWA persons demonstrated more support for restrictive political correctness norms and
more domain-specific dogmatism and strength of attitude (Conway et al., 2020).
According to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), authoritarianism has become the main
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political force driving political polarization; therefore, investigating authoritarianism in
the context of political partisanship is crucial to better understanding our current political
atmosphere. Political intolerance of opposing ideologies mediated by perceived threats
appears in individuals scoring high both in left and right-wing authoritarianism
(Crawford & Pilanski, 2012). The Ideological Conflict Hypothesis postulates that people
across the political spectrum are prejudiced against ideologically dissimilar target groups
(Brandt et al., 2014). Stemming from this hypothesis, research has found multiple ways
in which individuals with different political party affiliations and ideologies differ in
personality traits, neuroanatomy, perceptions of threat, and cognitive styles.
Differences Observed in Persons with Opposing Political Affiliations/Ideologies
Personality traits.
Much of the literature on personality and politics relies on the Big Five or Five
Factor Model. The Big Five factors or personality traits comprise openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Costa & McCrae,
1992). According to Gerber et al. (2012), personality traits substantially affect which
party individuals affiliate with, as well as the strength of their affiliation. A complicated
relationship exists between personality traits, political party affiliations, and ideologies.
Individuals with relatively high levels of openness are considered more
imaginative, curious, open to new ideas, and willing to re-evaluate values (Costa &
McCrae, 1992; Widiger & Costa, 2013). Individuals scoring high in openness have also
proven to be more curious, imaginative, emotional, and empathic when compared to
closed-minded individuals (Cosme et al., 2010). It should be noted that extreme levels of
openness are associated with personality disorders (histrionic, borderline, schizotypal,
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and narcissistic) and in the most extreme example, even schizophrenia (Widiger & Costa,
2013). Persons who score relatively low in openness tend to be more practical, rigid, and
to value authority and traditions (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Pathologically low levels of
openness are associated with other personality disorders, including obsessive-compulsive,
avoidant, schizoid, and paranoid (Widiger & Costa, 2013). In the political realm, the
openness trait has been positively associated with preferences for left-wing parties
(Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Vecchione et el., 2011). Mondak and Halperin (2008)
additionally found that individuals scoring higher on measures of openness are more
likely to identify as Democrats.
Persons who score high for the trait of conscientiousness tend to be orderly, selfdisciplined, and strive for achievement (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Conscientiousness has
been positively associated with preferences for right-wing or conservative parties (Baker
et al., 2015; Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Vecchione et al., 2011). Mondak and Halperin
(2008) found that those scoring high for conscientiousness are more likely to identify as
Republican and vote for Republican candidates. Previous research also indicated that
individuals scoring high for conscientiousness have stronger party identiﬁcation owing to
the trait’s associated characteristics of organization, control, motivation, reliability,
industriousness, ambition, and patterns of compliance, as well as preferences for structure
and order (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Gerber et al., 2012; Widiger & Costa, 2013). High
levels of aspects of conscientiousness have been associated with obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder (Widiger & Costa, 2013). Low levels of aspects of conscientiousness
have been associated with antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder,
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histrionic personality disorder, dependent personality disorder, and AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (APA, 2013; Widiger & Costa, 2013).
Individuals scoring high in extroversion tend to be social, active, action oriented,
outgoing, optimistic, and seek fun and excitement (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Widiger &
Costa, 2013). Extroversion has been related to preferences for right-wing parties
(Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Vecchione et al., 2011). The assertiveness and activity rooted
in the trait of extroversion is associated with an intention to remain loyal to their political
party; therefore, individuals with high levels of extroversion are more likely to
consistently identify as a partisan of a particular group (Farc & Sagarin, 2008; Gerber et
al., 2012).
According to Costa and McCrae (1992), the personality trait of agreeableness
refers to individuals who display modest, sympathetic, and altruistic behavior that is
prosocial and cooperative. Members of left-wing parties have been found to have higher
levels of agreeableness than their right-wing counterparts (Barbaranelli et al., 2007).
The personality trait of neuroticism is the most highly researched of all the Five
Factor traits. Neuroticism is related to the tendency to experience instability, frustrationintolerance, anxiety, anger, and sadness (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Widiger & Costa,
2013). Facets of neuroticism are associated with virtually every personality disorder,
apart from schizoid and most clinical syndromes (Widiger & Costa, 2013). Neuroticism
has been consistently associated with left-wing ideologies (Sibley et al., 2012).
According to a meta-analysis including 73 studies from 10 different countries, there is a
weak, albeit reliable, negative correlation between neuroticism and political conservatism
(Sibley et al., 2012).
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Extroverts and open-minded individuals have been found to be most likely to
identify strongly and stably with a political party (Baker et al., 2015). In addition to
evident personality differences in individuals with different political ideologies and party
affiliations, a great deal of research has highlighted neurological differences.
Neurological Differences.
Although political partisanship is often believed to result from environmental
influences, studies now implicate biological factors related to the establishment of
political orientation and partisan affiliation. Neuroimaging studies have indicated
differences in the amygdala, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in individuals
with differing political ideologies (Amodio et al., 2007; Fowler & Schrieber, 2008; Kanai
et al., 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013; van der Plas et al., 2010). For instance, in a study
examining the relationship between self-reported political attitudes to gray matter volume
using structural MRI, liberalism was found to be associated with increased gray matter
volume in the ACC, and conservatism was associated with increased volume in the right
amygdala (Kanai et al., 2011). The anterior cingulate cortex has many functions,
including error detection, conflict monitoring, cognitive control, evaluating competing
choices, as well as other important cognitive functions, such as attention (Kanai et al.,
2011). In addition, the ACC is consistent with sensitivity for processing signals of
potential change and for altering a habitual response pattern (Amodio et al., 2007; Kanai
et al., 2011). The right amygdala is bilaterally sensitive to emotional salience, such as
fear and increased processing of potential threats (van der Plas et al., 2010).
In another study, Schreiber et al. (2013) examined brain function in liberals and
conservatives by matching publicly available voter records to 82 subjects who performed
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a risk-taking task (Risky-Gains task) while in an fMRI, and found that Democratic
participants had significantly greater activity in the left insula, a region associated with
social and self-awareness, however, Republican participants had greater activity in the
right amygdala, which is associated with the body’s fight-or-flight reactivity system. In
this study, the researchers were able to accurately predict the political affiliation of
participants based on their brain activity with 82.9% accuracy, using a receiver-operator
characteristic curve and a stepwise linear discriminant function analysis with partisanship
as the dependent measure and the activation patterns in the areas that differed across
Democrats and Republicans as independent measures (Schreiber et al., 2013). A metaanalysis of 27,011 studies using various measures of cognitive abilities revealed a small
effect size of r = -.20 (CI 95%: -.23 to -.17; based on 67 studies, N = 84,017) for the
relationship between lower cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes and
higher scores on measures of prejudice; however, participants with more extensive
cognitive resources were more likely to embrace left-wing beliefs and to score lower on
measures of prejudice, small effect size of r = -.19 (CI 95%: -.23 to -.16; based on 23
studies, N = 27, 011; Onraet et al., 2015). These neurological differences prompt differing
perceptions of threat, which result in differing reactivity between individuals with
different political ideologies and affiliations.
Perception of threat and aggression.
Both humans and animals are said to have evolved to automatically scan their
environments for potential threats to increase survivability (Hermann, 2013). Out-group
threat, perceiving others who are not part of our group as a threat, is believed to be
automatically encoded as part of an individual’s out-group schema (Herrmann, 2013).
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According to a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center, 45% of Republicans
viewed Democratic policies as a threat, an increase from 37% in 2014 (2019). Moreover,
41% of Democrats perceived Republican policies as a threat, an increase of 10% from
2014 (Pew Research Center, 2019). Research has also found that individuals scoring high
in authoritarianism tend to view the world and diverse “others” as threatening (Duckitt &
Sibley, 2016).
Several studies have found differences in reactivity to threat between individuals
endorsing different political affiliations and ideologies (Jost et al., 2003; Kanai et al.,
2011; Vigil, 2010). A meta-analysis conducted by Jost et al. (2003) including 88 samples
from 12 countries concluded that political conservatism is partially motivated by the
management of uncertainty and threat. Moreover, Vigil (2010) found that in a sample of
838 college students, self-reported conservative “Republican sympathizers” displayed
heightened threat reactivity compared to liberal “Democrat sympathizers,” when
presented with a facial expression discrimination task. Subjects were asked to identify if
the face was expressing joy, sadness, or surprise, which were coded as non-threat, or
anger, fear, or disgust, which were coded as threat (Vigil, 2010). Individuals who
sympathized with the Republican Party had a lower threshold (M = 1.39, SD = .15) for
registering threatening stimuli from ambiguous social information compared to
individuals who identified as sympathizers of the Democratic Party (M = 1.36, SD = .15,
d = −.20; Vigil, 2010). Vigil concluded that the self-reported Republican orientation is
therefore associated with more basic or lower cognitive perceptual biases for detecting
threat, and that the Democrat orientation may be associated with higher threshold
perceptual biases for detecting threat (Vigil, 2010).
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Fear and aggression have also been demonstrated to predict conservatism
(Altemeyer, 1998); however, according to the reactive-liberals hypothesis, liberals are
inclined toward reactive conservatism as a defense against threats (Nail et al., 2009).
After Nail et al. (2008) experimentally induced threat, liberal participants were more
likely to endorse conservative positions, implying that conservative social cognition may
be a defensive reaction against feelings of personal vulnerability. According to
Dunwoody and Plane (2019), perceptions of out-group threat likely influence support for
certain policies and tendencies to target out-groups. The Justification-Suppression Model
postulates that perceptions of out-group threat often act as a justification for the
expression of prejudiced behavior (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). A meta-analysis
conducted by Jost et al. (2003) found that self-reported conservatives tend to respond to
threatening situations, such as exposure to out-groups, with more aggression than their
self-reported liberal counterparts. In general, when faced with ambiguous stimuli,
conservatives have perceived threatening, aggression-laden situations more frequently
than liberals (Kanai et al., 2011). Threats and uncertainties have been shown to increase
extremity of ideological commitment (McGregor et al., 2013).
Cognitive style.
In addition to personality, neurological, and threat perception differences,
research has noted evident differences in cognitive styles for persons of differing political
party identifications. Eichmeier and Stenhouse (2019) investigated the link between party
identification and several cognitive styles that are associated with open-minded thinking
and found that open-minded and rational cognitive styles were associated with
Democrats, while dogmatic cognitive styles were associated with Republicans. In a meta-
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analysis investigating the relationship between right‐wing attitudes and objective
measures of cognitive style on a set of 124 unique samples, intolerance of ambiguity and
cognitive ability yielded relationships of moderate strength with right‐wing attitudes (Van
Hiel et al., 2016). Jost (2017) additionally found that liberals generally score higher than
conservatives on measures of integrative complexity, cognitive reflection, need for
cognition, and uncertainty tolerance. In the same study, conservatives scored higher than
liberals on measures of personal need for order and structure, cognitive closure,
intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive rigidity, and dogmatism (Jost, 2017). These findings
are consistent with research showing that conscientiousness is positively associated with
preferences for right-wing or conservative parties, and openness is positively associated
with preferences for left-wing parties (Baker et al., 2015; Barbaranelli et al. 2007;
Vecchione et al., 2011). Overall, cognitive differences have been observed between
persons with differing political affiliations and ideologies. The cognitive style most
relevant to this study is cognitive rigidity.
Cognitive Rigidity/Flexibility and Political Affiliations
Defining cognitive rigidity and flexibility.
Cognitive flexibility is defined as the ability to adapt to novel or changing
environments and the capacity to switch between modes of thinking (Cools & Robbins,
2004). Cognitive flexibility can also be understood as the ability to easily switch
perspectives as one obtains new knowledge about a topic (Diamond, 2006). Kashdan and
Rottenburg (2010) conceptualized cognitive flexibility as the ability of individuals to
disengage from their cognitive or behavioral patterns of response if the initial pattern of
response is no longer effective in a particular situation. Cognitive flexibility, measured
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with objective behavioral assessments, has been found to predict intellectual humility, a
character virtue that allows individuals to recognize their potential fallibility when
forming and revising attitudes (Zmigrod et al., 2019). An individual with deficits in
cognitive flexibility would, therefore, persist with previously established rules or
behavioral patterns even when maladaptive or after encountering information that
contradicts those rules and patterns (Schultz & Searleman, 2002). Cognitive rigidity is the
opposite of cognitive flexibility, in that it is the tendency to perseverate in a particular
cognitive pattern even in situations where the pattern is no longer effective (Morris &
Mansell, 2018). Cognitive rigidity exhibits a psychological preference for clarity and
certainty (Jots et al., 2003; Rokeach, 1960). It also involves a lack of open-mindedness, a
refusal to consider ideas from different perspectives, and an inability to modify concepts
and attitudes once they have been developed to withstand criticism (Stewin, 1983).
According to Kasdan and Rottenberg (2010), the absence of cognitive flexibility often
denotes psychopathology for diagnoses such as depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The idea that those who are more dogmatic and
prejudiced are more psychologically inflexible stems back to the 1950s, when Adorno
first conceptualized the Authoritarian Personality (Zmigrod, 2020). Prejudice is believed
to be intricately intertwined with deeply rooted mental rigidity (Rokeach, 1954). An
ideologically rigid mind is inflexible in its reaction to ambiguity and change (Zmigrod,
2020). Two opposing hypotheses regarding cognitive rigidity and political identity
hypotheses are proposed in the literature: the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis and the
ideological extremity hypothesis.
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Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis.
The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis suggests that conservatives perceive the world
in a more rigid, less flexible manner than their liberal counterparts due to feelings of
uncertainty and fear that promote resistance towards change (van Prooijen et al., 2015).
The early work of Adorno et al. (1950) identified relationships between cognitive style
(rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity) and right-wing attitudes. According to a metaanalysis conducted by Jost et al. (2003) that examined studies conducted in various
countries including the U.S., Italy, Germany, Sweden, Israel, and England, conservatives
have displayed more structured and persistent cognitive styles as indicated by higher
average scores on psychological measures of personal needs for order, structure, and
closure compared to their liberal counterparts (Jost et al., 2003). Their liberal
counterparts were conversely found to be more receptive to informational complexity and
ambiguity. Jost et al. (2003) also found moderate-to-strong effect sizes concerning the
relationship between self-report measures of conservative cognitive style and right-wing
attitudes. Conversely, a follow-up meta-analysis that focused on behavioral measures of
cognitive style conducted by Van Hiel, Onraet, and De Pauw (2010) found weak-tomoderate relationships between cognitive style variables, such as rigidity and intolerance
of ambiguity, and right-wing attitudes. Right-wing attitudes measured by the RWA Scale
have been shown to partially mediate the relationship between cognitive rigidity and
conservatism (Crowson et al., 2010). Self-reported scales concerning cognitive styles
have yielded stronger relationships with right-wing attitudes compared to behavioral
measures (Van Hiel, Onraet, Crowson, & Roets, 2016). Other research has indicated that
a conservative political orientation may be associated with other rigid concepts, such as
dogmatism, intolerance, and authoritarianism (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Moreover,
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Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, and Cornelis (2011) found increased closed-mindedness among
people scoring highly on right-wing attitudes using self-report measures. The rigidity-ofthe-right hypothesis has been supported by several studies highlighting relationships
between conservatism and cognitive rigidity (Adorno, 1950; Jost et al., 2003; Van Hiel et
al., 2016; and Van Hiel et al., 2010). Jost et al. (2003) noted that although rigidity of the
left does occur, it is less common and harder to identify than rigidity of the right.
Ideological Extremity Hypothesis.
The ideological extremity hypothesis, also known as the rigidity-of-the-extreme
hypothesis, asserts that individuals at both political extremes (left/liberals and
right/conservatives) are less flexible in their thinking compared to moderates (Greenberg
& Jonas, 2003). The hypothesis argues that political extremism is underpinned by
cognitive rigidity that facilitates rigidity of attitudes (Zmigrod et al., 2019). Theories of
political extremism often emphasize the rigid nature of ideological beliefs at both
political extremes, including black-and-white thinking that categorizes the world as
positive or negative, good or bad, based on political affiliation (van Prooijen et al., 2015).
According to van Proojen and Krouwel (2019), individuals become radicalized and
adhere to extreme ideologies as a result of psychological distress that promotes a sense of
meaninglessness and anxious uncertainty. Political extremists on both ends of the
political spectrum have reported greater anxiety about their economic future (van
Prooijen et al., 2015). Feelings of distress prompt individuals to seek clarity, and
extremist belief systems provide meaning through straightforward and simplistic
assumptions that make the world appear less complex and more comprehensible
(Kruglanski et al., 2006). As a result of anxious uncertainty, distress, and fear, individuals
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tend to compensate through strong ideological convictions (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash,
2013). In a study of 700 U.S citizens, Zmigrod et al., (2020) found that partisan extremity
was correlated with lower levels of cognitive flexibility regardless of political orientation,
across three independent assessments of cognitive flexibility (Remote Associates Test,
Alternative Uses Test, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test). Political extremes of both
the left and the right have also displayed a greater conviction of the correctness of their
political beliefs compared to moderates (Toner et al., 2013). Belief superiority has
predicted a tendency to select information that reaffirms those beliefs (confirmation bias)
(Hall & Raimi, 2018). In addition, individuals with more extreme attitudes have the
capacity to project the extremity of their partisan attitudes onto others and perceive
greater polarization than do individuals with less extreme attitudes (Van Broven et al.,
2012). Political extremists at both ends of the political spectrum have been shown to
experience more rigidly negative emotions about politics compared to moderates (van
Prooijen et al., 2015). Extremists also have been shown to view the world in more
simplistic terms (Lammers et al., 2017) and perceived solutions to crises to be simpler
than moderates (Krouwel et al., 2018). Jost et al. (2003) argued that both hypotheses
(rigidity-of-the-right and the ideological extremity hypothesis) are not mutually
exclusive, and although rigidity of the left does exist, it is less common than rigidity of
the right. Cognitive rigidity in thinking processes has been identified as one of the
characteristics of ethnocentric thinking (Rokeach, 1948). According to Frenkel-Brunswik
(1949), individuals who are intolerant of ambiguity tend to “resort to black-white
solutions, to arrive at premature closure as to valuative aspects, often at the neglect of
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reality” (p. 115). This intolerance and tendency towards rigid and distorted thinking
(cognitive distortions) are believed to have roots at perceptual and cognitive levels.
Theory of Cognitive Distortions
According to cognitive theory, one’s subjectively biased evaluation of early life
experiences shapes and maintains fundamental beliefs known as schemas (Beck, 1970).
Schemas involve perceptions of the self, the world, and the future, and may be positive
and adaptive or dysfunctional (Beck & Weishaar, 1990). Schemas help individuals to
direct, filter, encode, and assess new situations as they are experienced (Beck, 1976).
They also play an important role in how individuals process and assign meaning to
stimuli in the environment, what information in the environment individuals attend to and
remember, and functional/dysfunctional cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns
(Beck, 1964). These fundamental beliefs develop into habitual ways of thinking that
support core beliefs and assumptions (Beck et al., 1979). Schema modality exists on a
continuum from flexible to rigid (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Individuals tend to use a filter
to identify information in situations that confirms their schemas and ignore evidence that
challenges them. According to Young et al., (2003), the predominant coping strategies for
individuals with maladaptive schemas include overcompensation, avoidance, and
surrender.
Cognitive distortions.
Cognitive distortions were first defined as identifiable errors in thinking that
occur when processing information (Beck, 1967). This information processing, which
predictably results in errors in thinking, occurs quickly, involuntarily, and in a biased
manner (Beck, 1995). Aaron Beck, the founder of Cognitive Behavior Therapy, first
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observed distorted thinking while treating individuals with depression (Beck, 1967). He
recognized that negative cognitions in his patients were often automatic and outside
conscious control (Beck, 1967). Cognitive distortions are now understood to be biased
evaluations of early experiences that shape and maintain fundamental beliefs known as
schemas (Beck, 1964). Beck defined schemas as cognitive structures that aid in
screening, coding, molding, and evaluating data in the world into thoughts and cognitions
(Beck, 1964). Beck’s schema theory maintained that these core beliefs and the content of
the schema are responsible for cognitive, emotional, and behavioral interactions that may
be adaptive or dysfunctional (Beck, 1976).
Beck (1967) identified six cognitive errors in thinking: (1) arbitrary inference; (2)
absolutistic or dichotomous thinking; (3) magnification and minimization; (4)
overgeneralization; (5) personalization; and (6) selective abstraction. Burns (1999)
expanded the list of cognitive errors, listing a total of ten cognitive distortions. According
to Burns, these cognitive distortions comprised: (1) all-or-nothing thinking; (2)
discounting the positive; (3) emotional reasoning; (4) jumping to conclusions; (5)
labeling; (6) magnification or minimization; (7) mental filter; (8) overgeneralization; (9)
personalization; (10) “should” statements. Several years later, Freeman and DeWolf
(1992) and Freeman and Oster (1992) identified three more cognitive distortions: (1)
comparison; (2) externalization of self-worth; (3) perfectionism (See Definition of
Terms).
Cognitive distortions are understood to play a pivotal role in the maintenance of
emotional disorders and personality disorders (Beck & Freedman, 1990; Rosenfield,
2004). According to Beck’s cognitive model, all common psychological disturbances
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involve dysfunctional thinking related to the cognitive triad, including automatic and
spontaneous negative thoughts about the self, the world, and the future (Beck & Beck,
2011). Cognitive distortions become habitual patterns of thinking that are triggered by
certain stimuli and supported by underlying beliefs established through past experiences
(Beck & Beck, 2011). These intermediate beliefs consist of conditional assumptions, core
beliefs, and rules included in Beck’s (1996) cognitive case conceptualization. Core
beliefs are related to one’s self-concept and maladaptive views of others (Beck, 1996).
Cognitive distortions may prevent individuals from testing their perceptions and
thoughts, which can consequently perpetuate their dysfunctional system, including
cognitions, behaviors, and emotions. When dysfunctional thinking is not tested, cognitive
distortions are often maintained in an individual’s belief system through confirmation
bias.
Function of cognitive distortions.
According to cognitive theory, cognitive distortions support one’s core beliefs and
assumptions (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2005). These habitual ways of thinking are supported
by generalizing, omitting, and distorting stimuli (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2005).
Evolutionary theory indicates that cognitive distortions developed as adaptive reactions in
response to perceptions of threats to one’s safety or belief system (Burns, 2008; Gilbert,
1998). According to Burns (2008), human beings have two types of thought, automatic
and rational. Automatic thought (system 1) occurs effortlessly and quickly, largely
influenced by emotional responses that prompt individuals to act; rational thought
(system 2) is a more effortful, logical, and thoroughly considered type of thinking (Burns,
2008). System 1 produces shortcuts called heuristics that allow individuals to function
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rapidly. Heuristics, however, can result in flawed thinking, or cognitive distortions
(Burns, 2008). Cognitive distortions act as mental shortcuts to aid in human survival
(Gilbert, 1998). Regarding the cognitive distortion of selective abstraction, Gilbert (1998)
postulated that this distortion arises because of attentional bias for negative information.
The distortion is believed to function as a means of detecting and attending to threats
quickly and efficiently to avoid a negative situation (Gilbert, 1998). Dichotomous
thinking, also known as all-or-nothing thinking, is believed to function as a means of
making quick judgements about whether a threat exists that requires a response (Gilbert,
1998). Arbitrary interference is considered adaptive because it allows individuals to
reduce the number of perceptions, interpretations, and choices in emergencies and act
more quickly. Emotional reasoning relies on emotions to interpret a situation to make
quick decisions, saving both time and mental effort (Gilbert, 1998). The cognitive
distortion, disqualifying the positives, is considered adaptive, because minimizing one’s
abilities may protect one from unrealistic expectations and demands by others (Gilbert,
1998). Gilbert (1998) proposed that social comparison is adaptive because it enables
people to fit in with the dominant group, to understand how to be socially successful, and
to recognize who in society is superior/inferior (Gilbert, 1998). Lastly, personalization,
known as self-blame, is believed to be adaptive by presenting a reductive illusion of
control over random threatening events (Gilbert, 1998).
Definition of Terms
Arbitrary Inference / Jumping to Conclusions: unwarranted connections
between ideas that are unrelated or drawing a negative conclusion in the absence
of evidence to support that conclusion (Persons, 1989, Beck et al., 1979).
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Dichotomous Thinking / Black-or-White Thinking: viewing all experiences
as falling into one of two categories (e.g., positive or negative), so if an
individual’s performance falls short, they view themself as a total failure (Beck et
al., 1979; Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999; Persons, 1989).
Catastrophizing: A process of evaluation, in which a person believes the
worst possible outcome did or will occur (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
Comparison: An individual’s propensity for negative self-comparison to
others, resulting in the conclusion that he or she is worse off than or inferior to
others (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992).
Discounting the Positive: An individual’s habit of discounting or
minimizing positive experiences, insisting that these lack meaning for some
spurious reason (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
Emotional Reasoning: The assumption that negative emotions reflect the
actual situation (e.g., someone feels something, therefore it must be true) (Burns,
1980, 1989, 1999).
Externalization of Self-Worth: An individual’s developing and sustaining
self-worth is based on how the external world views him or her (Freeman &
DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992).
Fortuneteller Error: A situation in which an individual anticipates a
negative outcome, and this anticipation convinces him or her that the prediction is
an already established fact (Burns, 1980).
Labeling: An individual adopts a negative or derogatory name instead of
describing his or her error (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
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Magnification: Referred to as the “binocular effect” by Burns (1980, 1989,
1999), magnification involves an individual exaggerating the importance or
consequence of some positive or negative thing, such as personal traits, events, or
situations.
Mind Reading: Refers to an individual arbitrarily concluding that someone
is reacting negatively to him or her without any evidence (Burns, 1980).
Minimization: A situation in which an individual discounts or diminishes
the importance of something until it seems insignificant (Beck et al., 1979).
Mislabeling: The description of an event with words that are inaccurate and
carry heavy emotional weight (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
Overgeneralization: The process of formulating assumptions or rules based
on a single negative event and applying these rules to unrelated situations,
creating a never-ending pattern of defeat (Beck et al., 1979; Burns, 1980, 1989,
1999).
Perfectionism: The condition in which someone constantly strives to meet
some internal or external standard of perfection without considering whether
those standards are reasonable (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster,
1992).
Personalization: An individual regards him- or herself as the cause of or
responsible for a negative occurrence when no evidence supports that conclusion
(Beck et al., 1979; Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999; Persons, 1989).
Selective Abstraction / Mental Filter: A situation in which an individual
focuses on a single negative aspect of a situation, inflating the importance of that
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negative detail but ignoring possible positive aspects, thereby interpreting the
entire situation in a negative context (Persons, 1989, Beck et al., 1979). Mental
filter is similar to selective abstraction, because it refers to identifying a single
negative detail and dwelling on it exclusively, darkening an individual’s view of
all reality (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
Should Statements: An individual’s internal expectations or demands on
him- or herself, without contemplating whether these expectations are reasonable
or commensurate with his or her abilities, often leading to feelings of guilt, anger,
and frustration (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999).
Cognitive distortions and aggression.
As previously discussed, cognitive distortions develop as adaptive reactions in
response to perceptions of threat to one's safety or belief system (Gilbert, 1998) and have
demonstrated an influence on negative psychological and physical health risk behaviors
(Uhl, 2007). In response to perceptions of threat, individuals protect themselves from
being dominated, controlled, devalued, or rejected by being watchful for potential threat
intrusions on personal interests and beliefs in order to ultimately protect their self-concept
(Latella-Zakhireh, 2009). Beliefs and assumptions influence perception of every
situation; however, faulty cognitions (distortions) and inaccurate attributions can create
vicious cycles that exacerbate anger and aggression (Latella-Zakhireh, 2009). Beck’s
(1999) anger sequence posits that perception of threats to self may perpetuate anger
responses as a means of protecting an individual’s self-concept. This sequence starts with
the initial threat triggering feelings of loss or fear that are distressing to an individual
(Beck, 1999). This distress prompts an individual to reactively project blame and anger
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toward the source of the perceived threat (Beck, 1999). According to Beck’s hostility
sequence, hostile behavior is provoked by a combination of destructive interpersonal
behaviors in combination with distorted thinking (Beck, 1999). Latella-Zakhireh (2009)
found that cognitive distortions related to magnification, externalization of self-worth,
and perfectionism as measured by the ICD, showed a positive relationship to the degree
of anger endorsed on the Mahan and DiTomasso Anger Scale by a non-clinical
population. A strong relationship emerged between cognitive distortions and components
of anger, including tendencies toward argumentativeness and loss of emotional control
(Latella-Zakhireh, 2009).
Biased perceptions resulting from cognitive distortions can cause individuals to
react internally or externally. Cognitive distortions have specifically predicted both
internalizing and externalizing problems (Barriga et al., 2008; Bruno, 2010). Internalizing
problems involve inner distress for an individual, such as symptoms of depression or
anxiety. Externalizing behaviors manifest as conflicts with others, such as aggressive,
disruptive, or antisocial behaviors (Achenbach & McConaughy, 1997). Externalizing
behaviors and aggression are more visible, and the consequences more overt (Dekovic et
al., 2004). According to Oostermeijer et al. (2017), aggression comprises both proactive
and reactive elements. Research has demonstrated a link between cognitive distortions
and proactive aggression (Oostermeijer et al., 2017). Reactive aggression is typically
related to blaming others and assuming the worst, and proactive aggression is related to
self-centeredness and minimizing/mislabeling (Oostermeijer et al., 2017). Cognitive
distortions are categorized as either self-serving or self-debasing (Barriga et al., 2008).
Self-serving cognitive distortions are associated with externalizing behaviors; self-
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debasing cognitive distortions are associated with internalizing behaviors (Barriga et al.,
2008; Bruno, 2010). Self-serving distortions serve to protect an individual from negative
self-concept involving self-blame (Barriga et al., 2008). Examples of distortions that fall
under the category of self-serving distortions would include assuming the worst and
minimizing/mislabeling. Self-debasing distortions are distortions that inaccurately
degrade the self in either direct or indirect ways (Barriga et al., 2008). Examples of selfdebasing distortions include personalizing, catastrophizing, overgeneralizing, and selfabstraction (Barriga et al., 2008). In a study conducted by Wallinius, Johansson, Larden
and Dernevik (2011), self-serving cognitive distortions as measured by the How I Think
Questionnaire were moderately to highly correlated with self-reported antisocial behavior
during both childhood and adulthood among the adults. Aggression Replacement
Training has helped individuals recognize internal cues for aggression, which lowered
levels of both cognitive distortions and antisocial behaviors, implying a relationship
between the two constructs (Gundersen & Svartdal, 2006). In summation, cognitive
distortions are forms of rigid thinking that have been linked to anger and aggression.
Historical Considerations
In the last year, several historic events occurred that have affected Americans
individually and in relation to political partisanship including the 2020 presidential
election, the Covid-19 pandemic, protests/riots related to political conflicts (e.g., the
attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021), and social/racial conflicts (e.g., the killing of
George Floyd). These events have only intensified the nation’s political divide and likely
played a role in the current study. A month before the 2020 presidential election, roughly
eight-in-ten registered voters on both sides of the political spectrum claimed that their
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differences with the opposition were about core American values, and roughly nine-in-ten
in both camps worried that a victory by the other would lead to “lasting harm” to the
United States (Pew Research Center, 2020). In addition to politically charged distress, a
recent Pew Research Center study (2020) found that 21% of Americans included in their
national survey reported experiencing high levels of psychological distress, including
nearly 28% of individuals who agreed that the COVID-19 outbreak changed their lives in
“a major way.”
After the 2020 presidential election, a Pew Research Center study (2021) reported
that 40% of Trump voters included in their national survey (n: 5,360), endorsed a belief
that Trump “definitely” won, and another 36% believed that he “probably” won the
election, despite losing both the popular and electoral vote by decisive margins. In the
Pew Research Center survey, older, less educated, and more conservative Trump
supporters were among the most likely to assert that Trump won the election (Pew
Research Center, 2021). Regarding the recent Capitol riot, majorities in both parties (95%
of Democrats and 79% of Republicans, including Independents leaning to each party)
endorsed that it was at least somewhat important that federal law enforcement agencies
find and prosecute those responsible for the attack on the Capitol, with Democrats more
intense in their views on this matter (Pew Research Center, 2021). According to the Pew
Research Center survey (2021), 86% of Democrats and Independents who lean toward
the Democratic Party considered finding and prosecuting rioters as very important,
compared to only half of Republicans and voters leaning Republican. Democrats and
Democratic-leaning Independents (73%) also considered right-wing extremism to be a
major problem, while a similar share of Republicans and voters leaning Republican

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, PARTISAN STRENGTH AND AUTHORITARIANISM

71

(76%) claimed the same about left-wing extremism (Pew Research Center, 2021). In
addition, 31% of Democrats endorsed left-wing extremism as a major problem, and 29%
of Republicans endorsed the same about right-wing extremism (Pew Research Center,
2021). About a month after former President Donald Trump was acquitted in his second
impeachment trial which focused on his conduct leading up to the attack on the U.S.
Capitol, just over half of Americans (52%) included in a national survey reported
believing former president Trump’s conduct was wrong, and that he should have been
convicted by the Senate. Nearly two-thirds of Republicans and GOP-leaners (65%)
believed that former president Trump’s conduct was not wrong, and that he should not
have been impeached by the House of Representatives. Only 11% of Republicans
endorsed that his conduct was wrong, and he should have been convicted by the Senate
(Pew Research Center, 2021). Conversely, an overwhelming majority of Democrats and
Democratic-leaning voters (87%) believed that former president Trump’s conduct was
wrong, and that the Senate should have convicted him (Pew Research Center,
2021). Divisions have also become evident within the GOP, with 37% of conservative
Republicans asserting that the Republican Party should censure or expel officeholders
who criticize former president Trump, compared to about half (52%) of more moderate
Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2021). Conservative Republicans were even less
tolerant of elected Republicans who voted to impeach or convict former president Trump,
with only 26% believing that the party should be very or somewhat tolerant of those who
did this, but 52% of more moderate Republicans stated that these officials should be
accepted by the party (Pew Research Center, 2021).
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The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed how pervasive the divide in
American politics is compared to other nations, with the outbreak proving to be a central
issue in the election. According to an October 2020 national poll, 82% of Joe Biden
supporters endorsed the outbreak as very important to their presidential vote, compared to
just 24% for Trump supporters (Pew Research Center, 2020). According to a Pew
Research Center study, 76% of Republicans, including Independents who lean to the
party, felt the U.S. had done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, compared
with just 29% of respondents who did not identify with the Republican Party. Moreover,
77% of Americans said the country was now more divided than before the outbreak.
Democrats and Republicans have differed over views of mask wearing, contact tracing,
how well public health officials are dealing with the crisis, whether to get a vaccine once
one was available, and whether life will remain changed in a major way after the
pandemic (Pew Research Center, 2020). Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and
authoritarianism, RWA and LWA were found to independently and positively predict
Americans' acceptance of 11 authoritarian policies and practices intended to mitigate the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Manson, 2020). Conway et al., (2020) found that
LWA bore a significant positive relation to Perceived COVID Threat, as measured by six
items concerning how threatened or worried they were about COVID-19 (e.g., “Thinking
about the coronavirus makes me feel threatened”) above and beyond political ideology.
Amid mass shootings in the U.S., gun policies continue to be divisive, with 81%
of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents believing there should be stricter gun
laws, in contrast to just 20% of Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2020). In addition,
amid protests regarding police shootings of individuals from minority populations, a Pew
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Research Center study (2020) found that 87% of Republicans and Republican-leaning
Independents and about 71% Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents concurred
with the statements that they had a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in police
officers to act in the best interests of the public. A wide division, however, existed
between black and white Democrats in their confidence in police officers, with 78% of
white Democrats agreeing that they had at least a fair amount of confidence in officers to
act in the public’s best interests while just 54% of black Democrats endorsed the same
statement (Pew Research Center, 2020). Social protests have also risen since the George
Floyd shooting. Among the public overall, 68% agreed that it is very important for the
country that people are free to peacefully protest, which is down from 74% two years
ago. In this case, the decline has come entirely from Republicans, with 53% of
Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents agreeing that it is very important for
the country that people are free to peacefully protest, down from 64% two years ago.
Gaps in the Research
A search of online databases Scopus, PsychArticles, PsychInfo, EBSCO, ERIC,
and GoogleScholar investigating cognitive rigidity among extreme political partisans and
moderates revealed no research into cognitive rigidity in the form of cognitive distortions
in individuals with different political party affiliations or varying degrees of ideological
commitment. Previous research has largely utilized objective measures of cognitive
rigidity, such as the RAT, AUT, or WCST, or subjective measures of cognitive rigidity
focusing on dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, or a need for cognitive closure. No
research to date has investigated the debate between the rigidity-of-the- right and the
ideological extremity hypothesis by using measures of cognitive distortions as an
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indicator of cognitive rigidity, despite cognitive distortions being a form of rigid thinking.
In addition, cognitive distortions have been investigated in many clinical and nonclinical
populations; however, they have not been studied in different political parties or
ideologies. Furthermore, little research has attempted to include political affiliations that
have become more prominent in the last decade in the United States (e.g., Socialists and
Communists) and has largely been limited in its scope of investigating liberal versus
conservative and Democrat versus Republican.
Current Study
Although numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals with different
political affiliations differ in cognitive styles, a search of the professional databases
disclosed no investigation of the relationship between the cognitive behavioral
conceptualization of cognitive distortions and political affiliation, ideology, or partisan
strength. In consequence, the purpose of this study was to determine whether there is a
significant difference in the frequency of cognitive distortions in individuals with
differing political party affiliations and partisan ideological strength commitments. The
study specifically intended to investigate whether there is a significant difference in the
frequency of cognitive distortions endorsed between individuals who identified as more
extreme in their ideological partisanship (very left wing and very right wing) compared to
those who identified as moderate. This study also attempted to explore political
affiliations that are less commonly included in research conducted in the United States,
such as National Socialists, Democratic Socialists, Socialists, and Communists regarding
their acknowledged frequency of cognitive distortions. Lastly, this study investigated the
potential influence of authoritarianism, partisan strength, and frequency of cognitive
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distortions has on a tendency toward aggression. Lilienfeld et al. (2009) argued that
"debiasing" people and reducing errors in thinking could be “among psychology's most
enduring legacies to the promotion of human welfare” (p. 391). Debiasing errors in
thinking might also reduce ideological extremism, as well as inter-and intragroup conflict
(Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Some success has already been observed in the use of the
technique of perspective-taking to reduce out-group stereotypes (Galinsky & Ku, 2004).
Other studies affirmed that basic education about cognitive biases can decrease an
individual's tendency to fall victim to certain errors in thinking (Evans et al., 1994).
This study will add to the field’s understanding of the role cognitive distortions play in
the context of political affiliation, political extremism, and violence. Moreover, this study
provides guidance for future research on ways to reduce political polarization and
resultant violence. In summary, the results of this study are intended to provide insight
into potential factors that can be targeted to reduce tension in our dichotomized political
atmosphere.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Research Design
This study used a quantitative, cross-sectional design to investigate relationships
between frequency of cognitive distortions, authoritarianism, political party affiliations,
ideological partisan strengths, and aggression.
Participants
Data were collected from 513 adult participants who were recruited via online
platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, and Researchmatch. Participants’ data
were included if the participant was between the ages of 18 and 85, conversant in
English, and a resident of the United States. The rationale for including only individuals
18 years and older was that the study hoped to assess attitudes of U.S. voters, and the
minimum legal voting age in the U.S. is 18 years old. In addition, the measures used in
the study were normed on individuals 18 years and older, with an upper age limit of 85
years old. Respondents were excluded from the study if they did not meet inclusion
criteria or did not complete measures in their entirety. Participants were limited to
individuals with internet access because the study was conducted entirely online via
REDCap, a widely accepted, secure web application on which to administer measures.
Screening and Recruitment
Demographic information was collected, including such relevant background
information as age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, highest level of education,
news networks watched, political ideology, and political affiliation.
Participants were recruited via online platforms including Facebook, Reddit,
Instagram, and Researchmatch.org as a means of collecting a sizable sample that would
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be representative of the general population. A recruitment flyer was posted on these sites
after PCOM IRB approval, which outlined the study, identified the principal and
responsible investigators, stated that participation was voluntary, offered the inducement
of a chance to win one of four $50 Amazon gift cards, and a link to study measures.
Respondents reviewed a document outlining informed consent and answered inclusion
and exclusion items prior to starting the questionnaire to determine if they were
appropriate for the study. If respondents did not meet inclusion criteria, they were so
notified and thanked for their interest in participating. All respondents deemed eligible
for the study were directed to the online REDCap questionnaire, starting with
demographic information. Online recruitment was used because it is a cost-effective and
a convenient means of recruiting participants in a timely and efficient manner. As of
2019, nine-in-ten U.S. adults reported they use online internet services, 81%
acknowledged owning a smartphone, and 72% stated that they use social media (Pew
Research Center, 2019). That final item was pertinent, because more than half of all
adults in the U.S. (52%) reported using Facebook to get their news (Pew Research
Center, 2019).
According to Best and Krueger (2004), data collected from internet-based
samples can efficiently allow researchers to acquire data using multiple measures from
diverse pools of possible participants. This study additionally used snowball sampling, a
form of convenience sampling in which participants of the study are asked to recruit
additional participants from their acquaintances. Nonprobability samples, such as those
established from snowball sampling, often result in samples representative of the general
population. Snowball sampling has proven both cost effective and efficient in gathering
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large groups of participants in a short time (Browne, 2005). Despite these advantages,
snowball sampling has limitations. The potential for sampling bias is a risk, because the
procedure is contingent on participants passing the study on to their acquaintances.
Despite such limitations, this sort of nonprobability sampling is widely accepted in the
existing literature and has demonstrated its sufficiency when investigating relationships
between variables (Cozby, 2007).
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire
Participants were asked to answer several demographic questions, including items
on age, race, gender, religion, socioeconomic status, highest level of education, level of
participation in recent protests, perspectives on/membership in activist/extremist groups,
and news outlets watched, listened to, or read.
Political Ideology
Participants were asked to identify their political ideology on a 5-point Likert
scale adapted from the 10-point scale used by van Prooijen et al. (2015), with the
following anchors: 5 = Very Right Wing to 1 = Very Left Wing, with a Moderate
midpoint. Those who identified as Moderates were directed to another screen asking
them to self-describe as leaning either to the right or left of the political spectrum.
Political Party/Group Affiliation and Partisan Strength
Participants were provided with a list of common party affiliations in the U.S. The
item read: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: Republican, Democrat,
Independent, Democratic Socialist, Socialist, Communist, Fascist/National Socialist or
Other Party?” The “Other Party” option allowed participants to write in any political
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party affiliation that may not have been included in the list. This method of assessing
political affiliation was adapted from Zmigrod et al. (2019). To measure political party
commitment, participants responded to the following prompt: “To what degree do you
identify with the political party you indicated above?” Participants were then asked to
indicate the strength of their political party partisanship on a 4-point Likert scale (1 =
minimal party identification to 4 = very strong party identification).
Right-Wing Authoritarian Scale
Robert Altemeyer’s RWA Scale (Altemeyer, 1998) was first proposed in 1981
and remains the most widely used measure of right-wing authoritarianism (Conway et al.,
2018). The scale assesses beliefs and attitudes concerning submission to authority,
aggression against noncompliers with authority, and adherence to social conventions that
are sanctioned by authority (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998). Right-wing authoritarian scale
scores correlated with measures of right-wing economic outlook (r = 0.62), nationalism,
(r = 0.66), ethnocentrism (r = 0.71), antiabortion (r = 0.60), and anti-equality and antifreedom attitudes (r = 0.84) (Altemeyer, 1998). Three of the Attitudes Toward Violence
Scale subscales (war, penal code violence, and corporal punishment) also correlated
significantly with scores on the RWA Scale (Benjamin, 2006). According to a recent
study conducted by Dunwoody and Plane (2019), despite criticisms and limitations, the
RWA scale remains a powerful tool for understanding contemporary U.S. political
attitudes. An empirical study by Conway et al. (2018) reported that 79% of the scales
from recent research that measured RWA used a version based on Altemeyer’s scale.
The RWA Scale includes 20 items in which participants select on a 7-point Likert
scale the degree to which they agree with a statement (1= disagree completely to 7 =
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agree completely; Altemeyer, 1998). Total scores range from 20 to 140. Higher scores
indicate higher right-wing authoritarianism. According to Crouse and Stalker (2007),
Altemeyer’s RWA Scale “provides a widely accepted operational definition of how
strongly a person holds right-wing authoritarian beliefs” (p. 25). The RWA scale has
good reliability with coefficient alpha typically measuring between 0.85 and 0.94.
Left Wing Authoritarian Scale
The Left-Wing Authoritarian Scale (LWA Scale; Conway et al., 2018) was
developed in 2018 and designed to parallel Robert Altemeyer’s (1996) RWA Scale.
Conway et al. (2018) directly rewrote the RWA Scale items so that they would refer to
liberal-left authorities and norms. The measure was normed using 475 undergraduates at
the University of Montana and 298 Mechanical Turk participants. The LWA scale
includes 20 statements to which participants respond on a 7-point Likert scale expressing
their level of agreement with the statement (1 = I disagree completely to 7 = I agree
completely). Interitem reliability for the scale was deemed satisfactory (α = .84). The
measure has shown significant correlations with liberalism, when liberalism was
operationalized as responses on a 9-point standard bipolar scale anchored by
liberal/conservative and Democratic/Republican used in prior research (e.g., Conway et
al., 2012; α = .86; Conway et al., 2018). The LWA scale has also shown significant
correlations with prejudice, operationalized as a version of McConahay’s (1986) Modern
Racism Scale adapted to religious minorities (r = .73; Conway et al., 2018). The LWA
scale was also positively correlated with the environmental-dogmatism scale (r[149] =
.41, p < .001) and with the strength of participants’ beliefs about climate change (r[150]
= .32, p < .001). These relationships paralleled similar relationships between RWA and
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dogmatism, prejudice, and strength of ideological commitment. In this study,
measurements of the strength of commitments were not available for all participants,
therefore, Conway et al. (2018) computed overall measurements both with and without
commitment strength. According to Conway et al. (2018), in the measurement that
excluded partisan commitment strength, the effect size for LWA and this overall
measurement (r[181] = .75, p < .001) were roughly the same as that for RWA (r[298] =.
70, p < .001; Fisher’s z comparing the two correlations = 1.11, p < .05). A similar result
emerged for the measurement that included commitment strength, with the effect size for
LWA (r[178] = 5.70, p < .001), nearly identical to that of RWA (r[172] = 5 .73, p <
.001). Conway, Zubrod, Chan, and McFarland (2020) also found that both liberal and
conservative participants rated the LWA scale as measuring authoritarianism, and that the
scale consistently predicted threat sensitivity, restrictive communication norms, negative
ratings of minority groups, and dogmatism.
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD)
The Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (Yurica, 2002) is a psychometrically
validated self-report instrument that was first developed as 120 self-report statements
representing 17 types of cognitive distortion (DiTomasso & Yurica, 2011; Yurica, 2002).
The principal investigation and development of the ICD used a sample of 188 patients
from two separate outpatient clinics. The sample included 66 participants who were used
as a control group. The original 120 statements related to distorted thinking were
evaluated by three experts in the field, and for an item to be selected for the inventory,
unanimous independent agreement was required and achieved to ensure content validity.
As a result of factor analyses, 69 items written in short sentences that measured 11
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cognitive distortions were retained to comprise the ICD. The items of the ICD are scored
on a 5-point Likert scale, with anchors ranging from 1 = Never to 5 = Always in terms of
frequency. Scores on the ICD can range from 69 to 345, with higher scores indicating a
greater frequency of cognitive distortions.
The ICD provides a total score of cognitive distortions, in addition to a score for
each subscale for individual cognitive distortions. Yurica’s (2002) study found high testretest reliability for total scores (r = .98) and internal reliability (r = .998). Concurrent
validity total scores on the ICD correlated significantly with other accepted measures of
distorted thinking and psychopathology, such as the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (r =
.70) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; r = .70; Yurica, 2002). Roberts (2015) also
found that the ICD correlated significantly with the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; r = .63).
The ICD was factor-analyzed to measure a total of 11 cognitive distortions. Brief
descriptions of these distortions follow. Arbitrary Inference, also known as jumping to
conclusions, involves making unwarranted connections between unrelated ideas or
drawing negative conclusions in the absence of evidence supporting that conclusion
(Beck et al., 1979). Comparison refers to the tendency to compare oneself to others in an
inferior light (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992). Emotional reasoning entails the assumption
that one’s emotional state reflects reality (Burns, 1999). Externalization of self-worth
refers to establishing and maintaining self-worth based on how an individual perceives
people in the external world view her or him (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman &
Oster, 1992). Fortune-telling describes an individual’s anticipation of a (generally)
negative outcome, and this anticipation convinces him or her that the predicted outcome
is already established fact (Burns, 1999). Magnification, also known as the binocular
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effect, refers to the tendency of individuals to exaggerate the importance or consequence
of some positive or negative personal trait, events, or situation (Burns, 1999). Mind
reading denotes the tendency to arbitrarily conclude that others are reacting in a certain
way, usually negatively, without any evidence (Burns, 1999). Minimization describes
arbitrarily discounting the importance of events to the point that they seem insignificant
(Beck et al., 1979). Labeling refers to attaching a negative name to oneself or others
(Burns, 1999). Perfectionism involves constantly striving to live up to some unobtainable
internal or external standard of perfection (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992).
The ICD has been used with both clinical and nonclinical populations. DiTomasso
and Yurica (2011) found positive correlations between cognitive distortions and anxiety
and depressive symptoms in a clinical population. Rosenfield (2004) investigated the
relationship between psychological disorders and cognitive distortions using the ICD.
Participants who met the criteria for DSM-IV-TR clinical syndromes and personality
disorders endorsed more frequent cognitive distortions. According to Rosenfield (2004),
approximately half of the variance for the severity and number of psychological disorders
was attributable to frequency of cognitive distortions. Strohmeier (2013) additionally
found a direct positive relationship between the severity of adult ADHD, as determined
by the Brown Attention Deficit Disorder Scale (BADDS; Brown, 1996), and the
frequency of cognitive distortions by administering the ICD to an outpatient adult
population (r = .487, p = .006). However, after accounting for anxiety, depression, and
personality pathology, specifically neuroticism, in adult outpatients, Serine (2016) found
that the ICD no longer manifested a relationship with ADHD severity, indicating that the
comorbidities accounted for cognitive distortions, but not adult ADHD.
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Despite the ICD being first validated using a clinical population, it has since been
validated in non-clinical populations. For example, the ICD has been used in several
community samples recruited from online platforms, fitness centers, churches,
community organizations, and healthcare centers (Latella-Zakhireh, 2009; Roberts, 2015;
Shook, 2010; Uhl, 2007). Using a community sample, the ICD displayed strong internal
reliability consistency (α = .97) with each subscale’s Cronbach’s alphas in the range of
.47 to .94 (Roberts, 2015). Weaker internal consistency was found in Emotional
Reasoning and Decision Making (Roberts, 2015). The ICD also displayed good
convergent validity in non-clinical populations based on a comparison with the
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (r = .7; Roberts, 2015). Roberts (2015) found that cognitive
distortions as measured by the ICD were able to predict levels of perceived stress in a
community sample. Using the ICD in a community sample, Roberts (2015) also
determined that on average, females endorsed significantly greater levels of cognitive
distortions compared to males, t (472) = -2.75, p = .006, Cohen’s d = -0.30. On average,
females (M = 176.18, SD = 33.12) displayed a statistically greater level of distorted
thinking than males (M = 166.26, SD = 32.31; Roberts, 2015). Depending on a
participant’s age, significant differences were found for participant’s total level of
cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD, F (2, 471) = 8.50, p < .001, with a large
effect size (η2 = 0.35) for the relationship between age and level of cognitive distortions.
Participants in the 18-29 age range (M = 179.82, SD = 32.99) reported a significantly
greater frequency of cognitive distortions than participants in the 41-85 age range (M =
164.98, SD = 31.86), and the effect size for this relationship was moderate (Cohen’s d =
0.46; Roberts, 2015). No significant differences were found between participants’ total
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level of cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD and participants’ level of education,
(F [3, 270] = 0.51, p = .68; Roberts, 2015).
The ICD has also served to investigate the relationship between cognitive
distortions and negative psychological and health risk behaviors (Shook, 2010; Uhl,
2007). Furthermore, in a community sample consisting of participants recruited from
churches and other community organizations, Latella-Zakhireh (2009) discovered that
cognitive distortions related to magnification, externalization of self-worth, and
perfectionism showed a significant positive relationship to components of anger
measured by the Mahan and DiTomasso Anger Scale, including tendencies toward
argumentativeness (the propensity to argue, with consequent job and relationship
problems) and emotional control (the tendency to lose control as a result of angry feelings
or thoughts; Latella-Zakhireh, 2009).
Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire
The Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992) is
considered the gold standard for measuring aggression (Gerevich et al., 2007). The
instrument shares some items from the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss‚ &
Durkee‚ 1957). The BPAQ originally included 52 items that were normed on 406 college
students (Buss & Perry, 1992). After a factor analysis excluded 23 items, 29 items
remained that comprise the final version of the BPAQ (Buss & Perry, 1992). This
measure has been adapted into shorter versions and validated in various countries. The
measure has been validated for use in the general population (Gerevich et al., 2007). In
completing the BPAQ, respondents rank 29 statements on how characteristic they are on
a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 = Extremely uncharacteristic to 5 = Extremely
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characteristic (Buss & Perry, 1992). The questionnaire evaluates several components of
the construct of aggression, including anger (physiological arousal and preparation for
aggression), verbal aggression, physical aggression, and hostility (feelings of ill will and
injustice).
Internal consistency of the four factors and the total score range between .72 and
.89 (Buss & Perry, 1992). Regarding test-retest reliability, group indices have ranged
from .72 to .8 (Buss & Perry, 1992). A more recent study found test-retest reliability for
each subscale as follows: Physical Aggression (.8), Verbal Aggression (.76), Anger (.72),
and Hostility (.72; Archer & Webb, 2006). This instrument’s internal consistency for
each factor was determined as follows: Physical Aggression (.85), Verbal Aggression
(.72), Anger (.83), and Hostility (.77), with Cronbach’s alpha for all items at .89 (Archer
& Webb, 2006). Buss and Perry (1992) found that the aggression scale positively related
to measures of impulsiveness and competitiveness. According to Harris (1997), the
BPAQ has moderate to high internal consistencies and is stable over seven months of
testing. Harris (1997) determined that the BPAQ scales were positively related to other
measures of aggression, including aggression items on the Morey Personality Assessment
Inventory (1991), the Olweus Lack of Frustration Scale (1986), and the Gladue
Aggression Inventory (1991). A study by Archer and Webb (2006) used a population of
307 university students to examine the relationship between the BPAQ and an act-based
aggression measure by assessing how frequently participants engaged in any of 25 direct
and indirect acts of aggression in the last two years. The study found that all four scales
were at least moderately related to behavioral measures of direct and indirect aggression
directed against partners and same-sex others. The strongest associations occurred
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between acts of direct aggression against same-sex others and the BPAQ physical and
verbal scales (r = .60 and .53, respectively; Archer & Webb, 2006). The subscale of
hostility was most strongly related to act-based measures of indirect aggression (r = .53;
Archer & Webb, 2006). Archer and Webb (2006) concluded that the associations
provided evidence for the convergent validity of measuring aggression by trait and actbased measures.
Procedure
Having met inclusion criteria, participants first completed a demographic
questionnaire including questions about age, gender, race, religion, socioeconomic status,
highest level of education, political ideology, party affiliation, level of participation in
recent protests, perspectives on/membership in activist/extremist groups, and news
outlets watched. Individuals who identified as moderate were asked to indicate whether
they leaned left or right in order to direct them to the appropriate authoritarian measure
(either the LWA or RWA Scale). In addition to completing the LWA or RWA Scale,
participants also completed the BPAQ and ICD. All participants responded to the
measures in the same order (Demographic questionnaire, either LWA or RWA Scale,
ICD, and BPAQ). This was intentional, so that the political measures could prime
participants to think politically when completing the ICD and BPAQ. After completing
the questionnaire, a separate tab offered participants the option of providing an email
address for the opportunity to win one of four gift cards. At the conclusion of the study,
participants were thanked for taking part and asked to forward the study link to
acquaintances to facilitate snowball sampling.
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Chapter 4: Results
Statistical analyses were computed via SPSS 27 to examine if self-reported
authoritarianism, strength of partisan commitment, and frequency of cognitive distortions
predicted endorsement of levels of aggression. In addition, the present study aimed to
determine if individuals that self-identified as “Very Right Wing” and “Very Left Wing”
reported significantly higher frequency of cognitive distortions compared to individuals
who self-identified as “Moderates.” This study also aimed to determine if a significant
difference existed in endorsed frequency of cognitive distortions between individuals
from different political party affiliations.
Statistical Analyses
The variables of interest were analyzed by means of SPSS 27. For the power
analysis, the effect size was set at .15, which is considered a medium effect size. The
significance level was set at .05, and the power level was set at .80. This analysis
determined that 360 participants were needed. This inferential/observational, crosssectional study intended to examine relationships between political party affiliations,
political ideologies, strength of partisan commitment, frequency of cognitive distortions,
authoritarianism, and aggression.
Demographic Analysis
Demographically, the sample consisted of 134 males, 369 females, eight
individuals who identified as nonbinary, and two who preferred not to answer (N = 513).
Regarding age, 35.1% of the population identified as age 25-44, with adequate
representation of other ages ranging from 18 to 85. Of the participants, 86% identified as
Caucasian, 3.7% Black or African American, 1.4% Latino or Hispanic, 2.9%
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Asian/Pacific Islander, .6% Native American, 2.9% Multi-ethnic, and 2.5% Other. As
evinced by the demographic statistics, the sample was not as diverse as researchers had
hoped. Regarding political view/ideology, 12.9% identified as Very Left Wing, 29% as
Left Wing, 14.8% as Slightly Left Wing, 25% as Moderate, 6.2% as Slightly Right Wing,
9.2% as Right Wing, and 2.7% as Very Right Wing. Concerning party identification,
38.8% identified as Democrat, 16.6% as Republican, 27.9% as Independent, 9.4% as
Democratic Socialist, 1.8% as Socialist, 1.6% as Communist, .2% as a National
Socialist/Fascist, and 3.9% as Other Party/Affiliation. Complete demographic results
appear in Table 1.

Table 1
Demographic Breakdown of Sample
Range

Age
Percentage

18-24

7.2

25-44

35.1

45-54

14.6

55-64

21.4

65-74

16.4

75 or older

5.3

Ethnicity

Ethnicity
Percentage

Caucasian
Black or
African
American
Latino or
Hispanic
Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Native
American
Multi-ethnic
Other

86.0

Party

Political Party
Percentage

Democrat

38.8

3.7

Republican

16.6

1.4

Independent

27.9

2.9

Democratic
Socialist

9.4

.6

Socialist

1.8

2.9
2.5

Communist
National
Socialist/
Fascist
Other Party/
Affiliation

1.6
.2

3.9

Political Ideology/View
Ideology/
Percentag
View
e
Very Left
12.9
Wing
Left Wing
29.0

Slightly Left
Wing
Moderate

14.8

Slightly
Right Wing
Right Wing
Very Right
Wing

6.2

25.1

9.2
2.7
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Hypothesis I.
To determine if self-reported authoritarianism, strength of partisan commitment,
and frequency of cognitive distortions predicted levels of endorsement of the use of
aggression for both right- and left-wing individuals, two multiple regressions were
conducted. The multiple regression analyses designated authoritarianism (operationalized
as LWA and RWA Scale scores, respectively), partisan strength, and frequency of
cognitive distortions (ICD Total) as the predictor variables and aggression (Total BPAQ
score) as the criterion variable. The first multiple regression examined individuals who
identified as liberal (Left Wing) who had completed the LWA Scale. The second multiple
regression assessed this relationship for individuals who identified as conservative (Right
Wing) and had completed the RWA Scale.
Tests of assumptions for multiple linear regression were conducted, including
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity. The Durbin-Watson statistic
was equal to 1.99 for the first regression and 2.14 for the second regression, which
implied the absence of autocorrelation. The collinearity diagnostics revealed that for each
of the predictor variables, there was no evidence of multicollinearity.
The regression analysis for those individuals who identified as Left Wing was
found to be statistically significant, (F [1, 369] = 147.07, p = .000), indicating that the
combination of these predictors made a significant contribution to the prediction of
aggression, as shown in Table 3. The coefficient of determination (R2 = .285) indicated
that approximately 28.5% of the variance in scores on the aggression measure was
associated with the combination of predictor variables (cognitive distortions, partisan
strength, and authoritarianism). An examination of each individual predictor variable
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revealed that only total scores on the ICD (i.e., frequency of cognitive distortions) made a
significant contribution to the variability in levels of aggression.
The regression analysis for those individuals who identified as Right Wing was
also statistically significant, (F [3, 138] = 30.71, p = .000), indicating that the
combination of these predictors made a significant contribution to the prediction of
aggression. Table 4 illustrates that the coefficient of determination, (R2 = .400), indicated
that approximately 40.0% of the variance observed in level of aggression was associated
with this combination of predictor variables (authoritarianism, partisan strength, and
reported frequency of cognitive distortions). An examination of each of the individual
predictor variables revealed that just as was the case with Left-Wing individuals, only
their score on the ICD made a significant contribution to the variability of the level of
aggression. Therefore, in both Left- and Right-Wing individuals the frequency of
cognitive distortions was found to predict aggression level, however, authoritarianism
and partisan commitment strength did not. In addition, frequency of cognitive distortions
was found to be more predictive of aggression for individuals who identified as Right
Wing (F [3, 138] = 30.71, p = .000; R2 = .400) than for individuals who identified as Left
Wing (F [1, 369] = 147.07, p = .000; R2 = .285). Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 illustrate these
findings in full.
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Table 2
Summary of Multiple Regression Predictor Variables to Dependent Variable for LeftWing Individuals

Model

R

R Square
.534a

1

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.285

.283

Durbin-Watson

13.27754

1.988

Table 3
Regression Analysis with Predictor Variables to the Dependent Variable for Left-Wing
Individuals

Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

25926.522

1

25926.522

Residual

65052.115

369

176.293

Total

90978.636

370

F
147.065

Sig.
.000*

Note. The regression analysis for those individuals who identified as Left Wing was found to be
statistically significant (as indicated by an asterisk), indicating that the combination of these
predictors made a significant contribution to the prediction of aggression.
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Table 4
Coefficients of Predictor Variables to the Dependent Variable for Left-Wing Individuals
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

1 (Constant)

Coefficients

Std. Error

Beta

38.240

5.686

Authoritarianism

.264

.986

Frequency of Cognitive

.201

.374

t

Sig.
6.725

.000*

.013

.267

.789

.017

.535

12.051

.720

.024

.520

.000*

Distortions
Partisan Strength

.604

Note. Only total scores on the ICD (i.e., frequency of cognitive distortions) made a significant
contribution to the variability in levels of aggression at a significance level (.000) marked with an
asterisk.

Table 5
Summary of Multiple Regression of Predictor Variables to Dependent Variable for
Right-Wing Individuals

Std. Error of the
Model

1

R

R Square

.633a

.400

Adjusted Square

.387

Estimate

13.26673

Durbin-Watson

2.139
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Table 6
Regression Analysis with Predictor Variables to the Dependent Variable for Right-Wing
Individuals
Model

Sum of Squares

1

df

Mean Square

F

Regression

16214.861

3

5404.954

Residual

24288.857

138

176.006

Total

40503.718

141

Sig.

30.709

.000*

Note. The regression analysis for those individuals who identified as Right Wing was found to be
statistically significant (as indicated by an asterisk), indicating that the combination of these
predictors made a significant contribution to the prediction of aggression.

Table 7
Coefficients of Predictor Variables to the Dependent Variable for Right-Wing
Individuals
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
1 (Constant)

Std. Error

39.198

6.113

.263

.028

Authoritarianism

.697

Partisan Strength

-.781

Frequency of Cognitive

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.
6.413

.000*

.629

9.509

.000*

1.117

.049

.624

.534

1.308

-.047

-.597

.551

Distortions

Note. A further examination of all predictor variables indicated that only score on the ICD made
a significant contribution to the variability of level of aggression (as indicated by an asterisk

Hypothesis II.
To examine strength of partisan commitment and to determine if individuals who
self-identify as Very Left Wing and Very Right Wing would report significantly higher
frequency of cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD compared to individuals who
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self-identify as Moderates, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted (N
= 209).
Normality is an assumption associated with a one-way ANOVA that requires each
sample be taken from a normally distributed population (Field, 2009). The normality
assumption was met using descriptive statistics (M, SD, skewness, kurtosis), as shown in
Table 7. The assumption of independence was also met, as the observations were random,
and the samples were taken from populations independent of each other (Field, 2009).
Concerning homogeneity of variance, Levene’s Test of Homogeneity was nonsignificant
(p = .145), which assumes that the variances of the distributions in the populations are
about equal. Results of the one-way ANOVA revealed that there were no significant
differences in frequency of endorsement of cognitive distortions: .05 level, F (2, 206) =
2.45, p = .089.

Table 8
ANOVA of Very Left Wing, Very Right Wing, or Moderate Individuals & Frequency of
Cognitive Distortions
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

N

M

SD

Std.

Lower

Upper

Error

Bound

Bound

Very Left

66

97.1818

49.81841 6.13222

Moderate

129

82.7829

40.56225

14
209

Very Right
Total

84.9349

109.4287

Skewness

.555

Kurtosis

.138

3.57131

75.7165

89.8494

.368

-.278

93.0000

42.80726 11.44072

68.2838

117.7162

.325

-.901

88.0144

44.13522 3.05290

81.9958

94.0329
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Table 9
ANOVA of Very Left Wing, Very Right Wing, and Moderate Individuals & Frequency of
Cognitive Distortions

Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

9425.216

2

4712.608

Within Groups

395741.741

206

1921.076

Total

405166.957

208

F

Sig.

2.453

.089

Hypothesis III.
To determine if there is a significant difference in endorsed frequency of
cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD between individuals of different political
party affiliations (N = 427), a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Political affiliation was
operationalized by a self-report item asking participants to select the political party they
identified with most. However, due to the insufficient number of participants selfidentifying as Democratic Socialists (n = 48), Socialists (n = 9), Communists (n = 8), or
Fascist/National Socialist (n = 1), these political groups were ineligible for inclusion in
the analysis. As a result, the ANOVA proceeded using 427 individuals who selfidentified as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Tests of assumptions for
normality and independence of observations were met, and Levene’s Test of
Homogeneity of variances was nonsignificant (p = .93). Results (displayed in Table 10)
revealed there were no significant differences in frequency of cognitive distortions
between participants who identified as Democrat, Republican, or Independent at the (p <
.05 level, F (2, 424) = .61, p = .542).
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Table 10
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in One-Way ANOVA of Potential Differences
in Frequency of Cognitive Distortion
95% Confidence Interval
for Mean

N

M

SD

Democrat

199

85.6884

42.05700

Republican

85

80.9529

39.31888

Independent

143

87.0769

Total

427

85.2108

Std.

Lower

Error

Bound

2.98134

Skewness

Kurtosis

Upper Bound

79.8092

91.5677

.463

.250

4.26473

72.4721

89.4338

.367

-.688

41.22799

3.44766

80.2616

93.8923

.129

-.433

41.21201

1.99439

81.2907

89.1308

Table 11
One-Way ANOVA Comparing Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in Frequency
of Cognitive Distortions

Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

2084.381

2

1042.191

Within Groups

721446.649

424

1701.525

Total

723531.030

426

F

Sig.
.613

.542

In relation to Hypothesis I, for both Left- and Right-Wing individuals, only
endorsement of the frequency of cognitive distortions was statistically significant in
predicting aggression levels operationalized as scores on the Buss-Perry Aggression
Questionnaire. Partisan ideological strength and authoritarianism were not predictive of
aggression. Concerning Hypothesis II, no significant difference emerged in frequency of
cognitive distortions between individuals who identified as Very Left Wing, Very Right
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Wing, and Moderate. For Hypothesis III, no significant differences appeared in
endorsement of the frequency of cognitive distortions between individuals who identified
as Democrat, Republican, and Independent.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The recent exacerbation of political polarization, accompanied by divergence of
political positions to ideological extremes, intolerance of competing views, partisan
animosity, and violence has made investigation of factors contributing to our increasingly
tense political climate imperative. Although numerous studies have demonstrated that
individuals with different political affiliations and ideologies think differently, a literature
review revealed no research investigating the role of cognitive distortion in relation to
political party affiliation, partisan commitment strength, authoritarianism, and aggression.
The results of this study provide new insight into different political affiliations and the
relation of partisan ideological strength to the self-reported frequency of cognitive
distortions. The study also contributes to research into the two competing hypotheses
regarding the concept of partisan bias, lending support to the symmetry hypothesis, which
predicts equal levels of partisan bias in the form of cognitive distortions in both liberals
and conservatives (Ditto et al., 2019). Moreover, the results of this study provide
information that expands the field’s understanding of the thought patterns of political
populations and how aggression relates to our current tense political climate. Overall, this
study’s insights and implications add to the field's understanding of potential factors
contributing to political polarization and animosity.
Findings and Implications of the Study
Hypothesis I. The current study revealed that the acknowledgement of frequency
of cognitive distortions (total score on ICD) predicted aggression, as operationalized as
the total score on the BPAQ, for left- and right-wing individual. However,
authoritarianism, independent of left- or right-wing predilection (judged from total score
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on LWA Scale or RWA Scale) and strength of partisan ideological identification did not
predict aggression.
The positive association of cognitive distortion with aggression level is consistent
with prior research, which found a strong relationship between cognitive distortions and
components of anger as measured by the Mahan and DiTomasso Anger Scale, including
tendencies toward argumentativeness (the propensity to argue, with consequent job and
relationship problems) and emotional dyscontrol (the tendency to lose control as a result
of angry feelings or thoughts (Latella-Zakhireh, 2009). The findings are also consistent
with research that linked cognitive rigidity to willingness to condone violence and
aggression (Zmigrod & Robbins, 2018).
This finding is additionally corroborated by Beck’s anger sequence (1999), and
evolutionary perspectives that posit cognitive distortions as developing from adaptive
reactions to threats into perpetuated anger responses as a means of protecting concepts of
self from others perceived as threats. This is relevant in the context of current trends in
political polarization in the United States, which show increased perceptions of threat by
individuals of different groups that likely contribute to the development of cognitive
distortions and result in increased aggression.
In contrast, the finding that authoritarianism was not predictive of heightened
aggression levels was surprising, due to the extensive research on aggression as one of
the three clusters that comprise authoritarianism, along with submission and
conventionalism (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). This finding instead appears
consistent with Duckitt’s claim (1989) that authoritarianism should be conceptualized in
terms of individuals’ identification with their own social group, as an attitude of
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uncritical submission to authority which, under certain circumstances, is expressed as
intolerant attitudes towards deviant groups. In that sense, aggression could be better
understood as a possible consequence of authoritarianism rather than one of its
components (Passini, 2008). Another potential rationale for this finding could be that the
priming effect of participants answering questions about authoritarian perspectives prior
to completing the aggression measure was insufficient to dispose the participants to
answer candidly about their aggressive tendencies in their interactions with political outgroups. According to Duckitt (1989), who proposed a more social-psychological
approach to authoritarianism, authoritarianism operates in a group context (Duckitt,
1989). Perhaps if the directions of the Buss-Perry Questionnaire included the instruction
to imagine someone who is from the participant’s least favorite political group, the results
would have been different. Participants would be primed to approach the aggression
items in the context of their identified in-group and a despised out-group. However, anger
and hostility in authoritarian individuals is very domain-specific to out-groups vilified by
those individuals’ in-group authority figures. Data indicate that people high in LWA are
likely to exhibit aggressive behavior (Costello et al., in press) and that people high in
LWA are likely to disdain out-groups and support divisive behaviors that could be
construed as aggressive (Conway et al., 2020). Nevertheless, on an individual level in
which aggression does not target specific out-groups, this did not appear to be the
case. Upon further investigation of our samples, however, another potential reason why
this study’s findings contradicted the original hypothesis concerning right-wing
individuals became evident. Total scores on the RWA Scale for the sample ranged from
22 to 133 (mean: 72.83), with most individuals below the midpoint of 100. McWilliams
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and Keil (2005) administered the RWA scale to a reasonably representative sample of
1000 Americans and discovered an average score of 72.5, indicating that most of this
study’s right-wing sample who scored in the average range on the RWA Scale were not
considered authoritarian based on those scores. For the LWA Scale, only 39% of the
sample fell above the midpoint, and total scores ranged from 51 to 130 (mean: 94.86),
with more variability in scores for left-wing participants on the LWA scale. Considering
the scores of both the left-wing and right-wing samples, it is believed that not enough
individuals scored high in authoritarianism to yield an effect size sufficient to examine
authoritarianism’s predictive abilities on aggression. The challenge of finding individuals
scoring high in authoritarianism for our study was consistent with observations made by
Van Hiel et al. (2006), who concluded that although authoritarianism does exist at both
ends of the political spectrum, it can be hard to find in the general population, particularly
LWA.
The composition of this study’s sample likely played a significant role in the
finding that strength of partisan commitment was not predictive of aggression levels.
Upon further investigation of the population, only 12.9% of participants identified as
Very Left Wing and only 2.7% identified as Very Right Wing. The difficulty in obtaining
individuals for this study who identified in these extremes appears consistent with a
large-scale national survey study conducted by Hawkins, Yudkin, Juan-Torres, and
Dixon (2018) that found very low numbers of individuals fit the definition of far right
(6%) and far left (Progressive Activists, 8%). Likewise, the vast majority of this study’s
sample did not fall into either extreme, making it difficult to draw significant conclusions
about the results. If the sample had included more individuals who identified as Very Left
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Wing and Very Right Wing, the study may have obtained results similar to those of
previous research on strength of partisan commitment and aggression, such as the work
of Kalmoe and Mason (2019), who studied lethal partisanship.
In addition to the difficulty of recruiting individuals from either political extreme
to participate in research (Campbell, 1957; Yale University, 2020), historical events in
the form of the significant political tension that occurred at the time of data collection
may have exacerbated the challenges the current study faced. These events included the
nationwide civil unrest following the killing of George Floyd and the rancorous 2020
Presidential election and its unprecedented aftermath, culminating in the attack on the
U.S. Capitol (Demirjian, 2021; Fisher, 2020; Taylor, 2021). One or more of these events
may have prompted individuals on the extremes of the political spectrum to be cautious
about participating in an undertaking like the current study, which requested disclosure of
personal political beliefs and behaviors related to these events. According to Yale
University’s Philip Corlett, “historically in times of upheaval, such as the great fire of
ancient Rome in 64 C.E. or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, paranoia and conspiratorial thinking
increased” (Yale University, 2020). Paranoia and social desirability therefore may also
have prompted individuals’ reluctance to self-identify with extreme political views, as
well as their strength of partisan commitment. In general, it is difficult to persuade
individuals on the extremes of the political spectrum to participate in research due to the
inherent nature of such radical groups, which deliberately leverage psychological
vulnerabilities, such as restricting access to information or circumstances that may
challenge ideological beliefs, as well as reinforcing in-group bias towards people outside
of their group (Brown et al., 2021).
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Hypothesis II. Results of this study’s analysis revealed no significant differences
in frequency of endorsement of cognitive distortions for participants who identified as
Very Left Wing, Very Right Wing, or Moderate. This finding is consistent with the
symmetry hypothesis, which predicts equal levels of partisan bias (in this case, cognitive
distortions) in liberals and conservatives (Ditto et al., 2019). The finding adds further
evidence to a meta-analysis including 51 experimental studies and 18,000 participants,
which found strong support found for the symmetry hypothesis, with no differences
discovered between liberals and conservatives in mean levels of biases across different
methodological variations and political topics (Ditto et al., 2019). Despite this being one
potential hypothesis explaining the finding, the limitation of having such small samples
of individuals who identified as Very Left Wing and Very Right Wing could have played a
role in this finding. As previously stated, the present study’s sample included only 12.9%
of participants who identified as Very Left Wing and 2.7% who identified as Very Right
Wing.
Hypothesis III. As previously mentioned, due to an insufficient number of
participants identifying as Democratic Socialists (48), Socialists (9), Communists (8), or
Fascist/National Socialists (1), these political groups could not be included in this study’s
analysis. As a result, the analysis proceeded with 427 individuals, who self-identified as
Democrats (199), Republicans (85), or Independents (143). Results of the analysis
revealed no significant differences in endorsement of frequency of cognitive distortions
between participants who identified as Democrat, Republican, or Independent. This
finding indicates that although research has found differences in cognitive styles and
anatomical brain structure in individuals with different political party affiliations
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(Amodio et al., 2007; Fowler & Schrieber, 2008; Kanai et al., 2011; Schreiber et al.,
2013; van der Plas et al., 2010), when it comes to frequency of cognitive distortions,
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents appear to be more similar than different, that
is, not statistically significant. The cognitive distortions, operationalized as total ICD
scores, have been correlated with psychopathology, including anxiety, depression, and
personality disorders. For example, Rosenfield (2004) found that almost 44% of the
variance in most Axis I and Axis II disorders was explained by cognitive distortions.
These findings are consistent with the cognitive model of emotional disorders (Alford &
Beck, 1997; Beck, 2020; Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979), which predicts that
dysfunctional cognition correlates with psychopathology.
In addition, Uhl (2007) found that differences in coping styles were associated
with cognitive distortions, and the more likely that individuals experienced cognitive
distortions, the more likely they were to engage in negative psychological and behavioral
risks as defined by the MBMD. This research, in combination with the present study,
suggests that perhaps Democrats, Republicans, and Independents also engage similar
negative psychological and behavioral risks based on their similar endorsements of
frequency of cognitive distortions. Despite results not supporting the hypothesis that
significant differences would be found in endorsement of frequency of cognitive
distortions between participants who identified as Democrat, Republican, or Independent,
this finding may offer some hope of resolving the nation’s political impasse, in that
individuals identifying with the major parties and Independents may have more in
common than one might predict. The United States’ political atmosphere continues to
emphasize differences between political groups, rather than common challenges these
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groups face that can be addressed collaboratively, in order to promote a divide/more
opposition. It is therefore crucial to identify and address these common challenges in
order to combat political polarization and animosity.
Social and Clinical Implications
Overall, this study contributes new information to the field’s understanding of the
current political climate in the United States. The combined findings that cognitive
distortions predict endorsement of aggression and that the frequency of cognitive
distortions in Democrats, Republicans, and Independents is not statistically different
provides hope. By addressing cognitive distortions that predict aggression in members of
different political groups, one might be able to reduce the growing hostility and related
aggression between political groups that threatens to destabilize the U.S. (French, 2020).
To be specific, an enormous body of empirical evidence proves that distorted thinking is
ameliorable. According to Beck's (1987, 1996) cognitive model, biased self‐relevant
thoughts, evaluations, and beliefs are key contributors to the development and persistence
of psychopathological states. Beck et al. (1979) emphasized thought self‐monitoring,
reality testing, external reattribution, evidence gathering, examining consequences,
cost/benefit analysis, generating alternatives, and behavioral assignments as the key
interventions for inducing cognitive change. Cognitive restructuring refers to a
collaborative therapeutic approach in which distressed individuals are taught to identify,
evaluate, and modify the faulty thoughts, evaluations, and beliefs that are considered
responsible for their psychological disturbance (Burns & Beck, 1978; Dobson &
Dozois, 2010; Hollon & Dimidjian, 2009). Cognitive restructuring was first developed as
a part of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for depression, and when applied correctly, the
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technique can help individuals learn to stop automatically trusting his or her thoughts as
representative of reality and begin testing those thoughts for accuracy (Mills et al., 2008).
By teaching individuals of different partisan groups how to identify, evaluate, and modify
the faulty thoughts, evaluations, and beliefs that may be causing them to act aggressively
towards others, clinicians may, therefore, be able to help reduce political animosity. In
addition, clinicians and even teachers can engage individuals in perspective-taking
strategies, such as those used by Galinksy & Ku (2004), and psychoeducation about
cognitive biases (Evans et al., 1994) to decrease individuals’ tendencies to fall victim to
certain errors in thinking that may have contributed to the tense political climate across
the U.S., such as all-or-nothing thinking, jumping to conclusions, and magnification.
Further research that supports the hypothesis that political tension and violence in the
United States could be reduced by specifically addressing cognitive distortions related to
the endorsement of aggression would be a welcome development.
Limitations
Several limitations of the current study should be noted. First, the sample was
recruited online and used a snowball, convenience-sampling method for collecting data,
which often results in a nonprobability sample that might limit generalizability of the
findings. Participants required access to the internet and needed to be active or know
someone who was active on online platforms such as Facebook, Reddit, Researchmatch,
or Instagram to access to the REDCap questionnaire. Certain populations who lacked
internet access or did not visit the online platforms used for recruiting may have been
unintentionally excluded from participation. Moreover, the percentage of participants
who identified as Caucasian in the study was higher than the most recent estimated
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percentage of white individuals in the United States in 2019 (86% vs. 76.3%; United
States Census Bureau, 2019). In addition, more participants identified as Left Wing than
Right Wing, with 72.3% identifying as left or left leaning and 27.7% identifying as right
or right leaning. The sample is not consistent with a national survey conducted by Gallup
(2019), in which a higher percentage of individuals identified as right of the political
center (37%) than left of the political center (24%). These limitations may also affect
external validity.
Another limitation of this study is its reliance on self-report measures. Self-report
measures are limited in the fact that they often require a level of introspective selfawareness and may be influenced by such factors as differences in the way participants
interpret individual items, social desirability (a type of response bias in which
respondents endorse an answer that they believe will be viewed more favorably by
others), and the participants’ affective state while completing the measure (Kazdin,
1998). To reduce the impact of social desirability, participants were assured that their
anonymity would be preserved. Despite these limitations, self-report measures continue
to be used for various constructs, including those employed by this study, with good
reliability and validity (Buss-Perry 1992; Conway et al., 2020; Roberts, 2015).
The use of the LWA Scale, which has been criticized for mirroring the RWA
Scale’s tripartite conceptualization of authoritarianism, is a potential limitation of the
current study (Costello et al., 2020). Criticism notwithstanding, the LWA Scale has been
correlated with liberalism, prejudice, and environmental dogmatism, and is one of the
few measures that has found evidence for left-wing authoritarianism in the general
population (Conway et al., 2018). The final limitation of this study was the fact that the
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sample included insufficient numbers of individuals from all the political groups whose
beliefs the study originally hoped to investigate (e.g., Communists and Socialists).
Future Directions
Due to the challenges encountered in recruiting participants identifying with some
political parties, especially those on the political margins (e.g., Communists) and more
extreme partisanship on both sides of the political spectrum, future studies should focus
more intently on recruiting individuals from these populations, so that they are better
represented in the literature and better understood. The current study sought to identify
potential contributing factors to the increased political polarization and animosity in the
United States. Cognitive distortions are one factor potentially contributing to aggression
in our current political climate; however, this study focused on total scores on the ICD
and did not attempt to relate political identification to specific types of cognitive
distortions, because the sample was too small to achieve statistical significance. The field
may therefore benefit from future studies investigating specific types of cognitive
distortions associated with different political affiliations, ideologies, and strength of
partisan commitment, in order to learn how to better target those distortions and inform
interventions that may help to increase adaptive and accurate cognition, with the goal of
reducing aggression.
All the measures included in this study were self-report and may have been
influenced by social desirability factors, despite the assurances of anonymity given to
participants. Future studies should seek to incorporate other types of measure, such as
proxy measures and objective measures, to learn if they provide results similar to this
study. Measures that tap into subconscious attitudes that may be associated with different
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party affiliations, such as the Implicit Association Tests, may be valuable in investigating
attitudes of these populations. Future studies might also investigate cognitive distortions
in the context of religious partisanship. Other factors that may be helpful to investigate as
a means of better understanding the current trend in political polarization and animosity
may be level of exposure to discrimination, level of exposure to opposing views,
perceived belonging/acceptance, national events (i.e., elections, natural/man-made
disasters, and pandemics), and psychopathology.
Furthermore, future studies may also seek to study different interventions to
address cognitive distortion related to news consumption. Ramasubramanian (2007)
found that a combination of an audience-centered approach that explicitly instructs
audiences to be critical media consumers prior to exposure and message-centered
approaches that involve debunking stereotypes and counter-stereotyping news stories can
counter racial stereotypes activated by news stories. Because of the finding that
frequency of cognitive distortions is predictive of aggression levels, future studies may
also establish groups involving perspective taking techniques (Galinksy & Ku, 2004) and
psychoeducation about cognitive distortions (Evans et al., 1994) for individuals of
various political partisanships to test whether targeting cognitive distortions can create
widespread reduction of political tension in the U.S.
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